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 LESSONS LEARNED FROM CSX CORP. V. 
CHILDREN’S INVESTMENT FUND 
MANAGEMENT AND PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM 
Sean M. Donahue* 
The federal securities laws governing beneficial ownership do not 
capture ownership positions in equity swaps or other similar instruments. 
In the majority of situations these owners do not possess voting or 
investment power as defined in Rule 13d-3(a) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act, and thus, they do not have a disclosure obligation. Such 
persons, however, do have the ability to significantly influence the voting or 
disposition of the securities of a company. In fact, because their ownership 
positions remain hidden, these persons can gain an unfair advantage in a 
proxy contest or engage in a stealth takeover. 
Issues related to hidden ownership were litigated in the case of CSX 
Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management, where a hedge fund 
acquired long positions in equity swaps giving it the same economic 
interests as stock ownership, and then, with the help of another hedge fund, 
launched a proxy contest. An analysis of the facts in this case and the 
holdings of the court offer great insight into the decoupling of economic 
interests from voting rights and investment power. 
This Article examines CSX and concludes that Rule 13d-3(a) should be 
amended to require disclosure by beneficial owners of equity swaps and 
other similar instruments. It further provides a specific disclosure 
recommendation for the amendment of that Rule. This Article also explores 
Rule 13d-3(b), reasoning that this Rule should be construed in a manner 
analogous to the safe harbors contained in Rule 144A and Regulation S, 
and, therefore, only apply when a person is also a beneficial owner under 
Rule 13d-3(a). Lastly, this Article demonstrates that sterilization of votes is 
a necessary remedy under § 13(d) and argues that courts should more 
frequently enjoin persons who violate this statute from voting at 
shareholder meetings. 
                                                          
 *  Attorney-Adviser, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.; LL.M., 
Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; J.D., Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law, 2007; M.B.A., Cleveland State University, Nance College of Business 
Administration, 2007; B.S., Duquesne University, 2004. The author extends his gratitude to 
Professor Donald C. Langevoort for his guidance and support. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or 
statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author who is not 
working on issues related to possible regulatory changes in the treatment of equity swaps under 
the beneficial ownership rules. The author’s views do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Commission, or of the author’s colleagues upon the Staff of the Commission. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal securities laws governing beneficial ownership are such 
that the owner of a long position in an equity swap or similar instrument 
(Long Party or Long Parties) that has the same economic interest as a 
holder of common stock does not have to disclose his ownership position 
because he does not have beneficial ownership of the securities.1 This 
person does not have beneficial ownership because he does not possess 
voting or investment power.2 The Long Party has an economic interest in 
the security because he is entitled to any increase in the value of the 
underlying stock and any dividends; however, he owns a derivative security 
                                                          
 1. 2 EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES 
AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 14.02[2][a] (9th ed. 2008). But see CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. 
Fund Mgmt. (UK) L.L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. App’x 133 (2d 
Cir. 2008); ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT—TENDER OFFERS AND STOCK 
ACCUMULATIONS § 2.12 (2009); James P. Smith & Corinne Levy, ‘CSX’: Second Circuit 
Upholds Denial of Injunctive Relief, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 2008, at 4; Letter from Brian V. Breheny, 
Deputy Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, United States 
District Judge, Southern District of New York (June 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/CSX-BrianBrehenyLtrToJudgeKaplan.pdf 
[hereinafter Breheny Letter]. 
Although a long position under an equity swap would generally not be treated as 
beneficial ownership of the underlying security under Rule 13d-3 under the Exchange 
Act, as the “long” party would not typically have the right to vote or dispose of the 
underlying shares, Schedule 13D (but not Schedule 13G) requires the disclosure by a 
reporting person of contracts involving the relevant shares.  
GREENE ET AL., supra, § 14.02[2][a] n.26.  
  Prior to CSX’s lawsuit, the prevailing wisdom was that ‘masked ownership,’ while 
smacking of gamesmanship, was permissible under the existing proxy rules because a 
long position in a cash-settled swap, standing alone, constitutes neither actual nor 
beneficial ownership of the referenced shares. (Section 13(d) requires disclosure only 
by ‘beneficial owners.’).  
Smith & Levy, supra. 
[A] person who is a party to a cash-settled swap does not beneficially own the securities 
subject to the swap if he does not have the right to vote or to sell those securities either 
pursuant to the swap’s contractual terms or pursuant to another understanding or 
arrangement with the counterparty to the swap. Thus, a party to a cash-settled swap not 
possessing such voting or dispositive power has no Section 13(d) reporting duty, no 
matter how large a percent of the stock is the subject of the cash-settled swap. 
JACOBS, supra, § 2.12. 
The Division believes that interpreting an investor’s beneficial ownership under Rule 
13d-3 to include shares used in a counter-party’s hedge, absent unusual circumstances, 
would be novel and would create significant uncertainties for investors who have used 
equity swaps in accordance with accepted market practices understood to be based on 
reasonably well-settled law. 
Breheny Letter, supra, at 4. 
 2. Breheny Letter, supra note 1, at 2.  
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rather than physical shares.3 As such, ownership voting rights and 
investment power over the security have been decoupled from the economic 
interest in the security and, rather, are held by the short counterparty (Short 
Party or Short Parties) to the swap to the extent that the Short Party has 
hedged by acquiring the securities underlying the swap (Matched Shares).4 
Where the Long Party has economic ownership of securities that are not 
required to be disclosed under § 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 (the Exchange Act), he has “hidden ownership” of the securities.5 If 
the person also has informal voting power, then he has “hidden morphable 
ownership.”6 Additionally, the Long Party can have investment power 
where the Short Party has no means to hedge other than by acquiring the 
security underlying the equity swap, acquiring Matched Shares, and then 
selling the security upon the unwinding of the swap.7 
The phenomenon of hidden ownership was litigated in CSX Corp. v. 
Children’s Investment Fund Management, where a hedge fund, The 
Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) L.L.P. (TCI), which owned 
a long position in a total return equity swap (TRS), was sued by CSX 
Corporation (CSX), a railroad company, for failing to disclose its beneficial 
ownership during CSX’s attempt to thwart the hedge fund’s efforts in a 
                                                          
 3. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, § 14.02[2][a].  
  An equity swap typically involves an agreement between two parties to exchange a 
series of payments determined by reference to the change in value of a notional 
quantity of a single security or group or index of securities (the “reference securities”) 
over a specified period. In a typical equity swap, one party (the “long party”) will make 
payments based on the amount of any depreciation in the value of the reference 
securities during the relevant period, as well as a payment of notional interest based on 
the notional value of the contract. The other party (the “short party”) will make 
payments based on the amount of any appreciation in the value of the reference 
securities during the relevant period, as well as, in some cases, the amount of any 
dividends or distributions paid with respect to the reference securities during this 
period. 
Id. 
 4. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006).  
A second approach [to decoupling] employs an equity swap, in which the person with 
the long equity side (the “equity leg”) of the swap acquires economic ownership of 
shares (but not voting rights) from the short side (the “interest leg”). The short side 
often hedges its economic risk by holding shares, thus ending up with votes but no net 
economic ownership. 
Id. 
 5. Id. at 825 (“If a person has economic ownership that disclosure rules do not cover (or can 
reasonably be interpreted by the person as not covering), we call this ‘hidden ownership.’”).  
 6. Id. at 825–26. (“If in practice, this hidden ownership includes informal voting rights, we 
term this ‘hidden (morphable) ownership.’ These ‘morphable voting rights’ will generally not be 
verifiable by outsiders, and depend on market customs.”).  
 7. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) L.L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 541–43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008). 
224 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
proxy contest.8 This Article posits that TCI had hidden ownership of the 
securities because it possessed economic ownership of swaps that did not 
have to be disclosed under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulations.9 CSX argued, and the court found, that TCI had hidden 
morphable ownership because, in at least some instances, there was 
evidence it could influence the voting of the securities by the Short Parties, 
or obtain voting power by engaging in an exchange unwind.10 The latter 
occurs where the Long Party unwinds the swap and acquires the shares used 
by the Short Party to hedge the swap, either from the Short Party or in the 
open market.11 CSX also asserted, and the court found, that TCI had 
investment power because there was no conceivable way for the Short Party 
to hedge other than acquiring the Matched Shares; once TCI unwound the 
swap, the Short Party would be forced to sell the shares either to TCI or in 
the open market.12 While the court did not reach the question of whether 
TCI was a beneficial owner of CSX shares, it stated that “there are 
substantial reasons for concluding that TCI is the beneficial owner of the 
CSX shares held as hedges by its short counterparties.”13 
                                                          
 8. Id. at 516. 
 9. While the court decided that TCI had a disclosable position in the swaps because it met the 
definition of beneficial owner in Rule 13d-3(b), and inferred, while it did not decide the question 
that TCI quite probably met the definition of beneficial owner in Rule 13d-3(a), this Article 
concludes that there was no beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3, and thus no disclosure was 
required. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
 10. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (“[T]here . . . is reason to believe that TCI was in a 
position to influence the counterparties, especially Deutsche Bank, with respect to the exercise of 
their voting rights.”). 
 11. Letter from Professor Bernard S. Black, Professor of Law & Finance, University of Texas 
Law School, to Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel, SEC 9 (May 29, 2008), available at 
http://law.du.edu/images/uploads/corporate-governance/disclosure-csx-children-defendants-
repsonse.pdf [hereinafter Black Letter]. 
When a swap expires, or is terminated early, the dealer, assuming it has hedged, will 
usually seek to unwind the hedge. If the dealer has hedged with matched shares, it will 
usually sell most or all of the matched shares. . . . 
In some cases, a long equity swap holder will seek to replace that position with full 
ownership of shares by unwinding the swap and, at the same time or nearly the same 
time, purchasing shares in the market. I will call this an “exchange unwind.”  
Id.  
 12. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 546.  
TCI patently had the power to cause the counterparties to buy CSX. At the very least, it 
had the power to influence them to do so. And once the counterparties bought the 
shares, TCI had the practical ability to cause them to sell simply by unwinding the swap 
transactions. Certainly the banks had no intention of allowing their swap desks to hold 
the unhedged long positions that would have resulted from the unwinding of the swaps.  
Id. 
 13. Id. at 545.  
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However, the court did reach the question of whether TCI should be 
deemed a beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(b) of the Exchange Act.14 The 
court held that TCI was a beneficial owner because it purchased the swaps 
with the purpose and effect of preventing the vesting of beneficial 
ownership of the securities as part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
reporting requirements of § 13(d).15 The court further held that TCI and 3G 
Fund L.P. (3G), another hedge fund that was a party to the litigation, 
formed a group for the purposes of § 13(d), and violated § 13(d) because 
they did not file a Schedule 13D until ten months later.16 In fashioning a 
remedy for the group’s disclosure violation, the court enjoined the group 
members from future violations of § 13(d), but chose not to enjoin them 
from voting in the proxy contest. In the court’s view, sterilization was not 
an appropriate remedy for the disclosure violation because CSX did not 
show a threat of irreparable harm, especially given that corrective 
disclosure had already been made.17  
The court’s first conclusion is incorrect because Long Parties’ holdings 
in equity swaps do not have to be reported under § 13(d). The reason is that 
such parties are not beneficial owners as defined in Rule 13d-3(a) because 
they do not possess voting or investment power over the securities.18 While 
the court’s conclusion was incorrect, given the current state of the law, Rule 
13d-3(a) should be amended to require disclosure of Long Parties’ holdings 
in equity swaps and this Article provides a recommendation as to how the 
Rule should be revised to require such disclosure.19 The court’s second 
holding also was incorrect because TCI did not engage in a plan or scheme 
to evade the reporting requirements of § 13(d) since it was not a beneficial 
owner of the securities (as defined in Rule 13d-3(a)).20 With respect to the 
formation of a group, the court properly held that TCI and 3G formed a  
§ 13(d) group ten months prior to filing a Schedule 13D in violation of  
                                                          
 14. Id. at 548–52. 
 15. Id. at 552.  
  In sum, the Court finds that TCI created and used the TRSs with the purpose and 
effect of preventing the vesting of beneficial ownership in TCI as part of a plan or 
scheme to evade the reporting requirements of Section 13(d). Under the plain language 
of Rule 13d-3(b), it thus is deemed to be a beneficial owner of the shares held by its 
counterparties to hedge their short exposures created by the TRSs.  
Id. 
 16. Id. at 554–55 (“In the last analysis, the question comes down to whether this trier of fact 
 . . . is persuaded that TCI and 3G formed a group with respect to CSX securities earlier than they 
claim. It finds that they did so no later than February 13, 2007.”).  
 17. Id. at 572 (“[T]his Court holds that a threat of irreparable injury is essential to obtain an 
injunction sterilizing any of defendants’ voting rights and that plaintiff has failed to establish such 
a threat.”).   
 18. See infra Part IV.A. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part IV.B. 
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§ 13(d).21 In determining the proper remedy for the group’s disclosure 
violation, however, the court incorrectly held that sterilization was not an 
appropriate remedy because sterilization was not necessary in order to 
prevent an unfair director election.22 
This Article analyzes the CSX case, advocates proposals for reform, and 
adds to the current literature on § 13(d) of the Exchange Act in three 
important ways. First, it provides a specific disclosure recommendation that 
the Commission can adopt by amending Rule 13d-3(a) to require disclosure 
of Long Parties’ holdings in equity swaps. While other authors have 
proposed a recommendation as to how the broad disclosure regime 
regarding beneficial ownership should be revised,23 advocated for a 
judicially imposed solution,24 or simply argued for Commission action,25 no 
other law review article sets forth a specific disclosure recommendation for 
Rule 13d-3(a). Second, this Article provides an analysis of Rule 13d-3(b), 
reasoning that it should be construed in a manner analogous to the safe 
harbors contained in Rule 144A and Regulation S, and thus should apply 
only when one is a beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(a).26 Lastly, it 
explores the remedy of sterilization of votes in the § 13(d) context by 
examining the case law and the Commission’s positions in this area and 
concludes that this remedy should be granted more frequently.  
Part II of this Article provides an overview of equity swaps, § 13(d), 
and the decoupling of economic interests from voting rights and investment 
power. Part III examines the facts and holdings of the CSX case. Part IV 
critiques these rulings and sets forth proposals for reform. Part V concludes 
the Article. 
                                                          
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
 22. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 567–73. 
 23. See Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 875–86.  
[T]he ownership disclosure rules can be much simplified and better integrated. 
Currently, there are five distinct, highly idiosyncratic, complex SEC ownership 
disclosure regimes. These disclosure regimes apply respectively to large active 
shareholders (Schedule 13D), large passive shareholders (Schedule 13G), institutional 
investors generally (Form 13F), insiders and 10% shareholders (Section 16), and 
mutual funds. Our proposals would significantly simplify this complex scheme, and 
move toward an integrated system for share ownership disclosure that builds on 
existing Section 16 and mutual fund disclosure rules. 
Id. at 820. 
 24. See Daniel Bertaccini, Note, To Disclose or Not to Disclose? CSX Corp., Total Return 
Swaps, and Their Implications for Schedule 13D Filing Purposes, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 270 
(2009). 
 25. See Brian T. Sullivan, CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management and the 
Need for SEC Expansion of Beneficial Ownership, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1300 (2009). 
 26. This argument does not seem to have been made in any other article. While the Sullivan 
note analyzes Rule 13d-3(b), it does not provide a conclusion based on the safe harbors contained 
in Rule 144A and Regulation S of the Securities Act. See generally id.   
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II. SWAPS, SECTION 13(D), AND DECOUPLING 
A. EQUITY SWAPS 
Usually an equity swap entails two parties making payments to one 
another where at least one set of payments is determined by the return of a 
stock or a stock index (the Reference Security or Reference Securities).27 
Typically, the Long Party will make payments based on the amount of any 
depreciation in the value of the Reference Securities and a payment of 
notional interest based on the interest that accrues at a negotiated rate on an 
agreed upon principal amount.28 This payment of notional interest 
compensates the Short Party for the cost of financing its position hedging 
the swap, even if it chooses not to hedge, by giving it an amount equal to 
the interest at the negotiated rate that would have been payable had it 
actually loaned the Long Party the notional amount.29 On the other hand, 
                                                          
 27. See, e.g., GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, § 14.02[2][a] (“An equity swap typically involves 
an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of payments determined by reference to 
the change in value of a notional quantity of a single security or group or index of securities (the 
‘reference securities’) over a specified period.”); Don M. Chance, Equity Swaps and Equity 
Investing, J. ALTERNATIVE INV., Summer 2004, at 75, 75–76. 
[A]n equity swap is a transaction between two parties in which each party agrees to 
make a series of payments to the other, with at least one set of payments determined by 
the return on a stock or stock index. The return is calculated based on a given notional 
principal and may or may not include dividends. The payments occur on regularly 
scheduled dates over a specified period of time. 
Chance, supra, at 76. 
 28. GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, § 14.02[2][a]; see also CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund 
Mgmt. (UK) L.L.P, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
Counterparty A—the “short” party—agrees to pay Counterparty B—the “long” party—
cash flows based on the performance of a defined underlying asset in exchange for 
payments by the long party based on the interest that accrues at a negotiated rate on an 
agreed principal amount (the “notional amount”). . . . Counterparty A, referred to as the 
“total return payer” or “beneficiary,” is entitled to receive from Counterparty B (1) an 
amount equal to the interest at the negotiated rate that would have been payable had it 
actually loaned Counterparty A the notional amount, and (2) any decrease in the market 
value of the referenced asset.  
CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
The notional amount typically is the value of the referenced asset at the time the 
transaction is agreed and may be recalculated periodically. The difference between the 
reference rate and the negotiated interest rate of the swap depends on (1) the 
creditworthiness of the two parties, (2) characteristics of the underlying asset, (3) the 
total return payer’s cost of financing, risk, and desired profit, and (4) market 
competition. 
Id. at 520 n.13 (internal citation omitted). 
 29. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, § 14.02[2][a]. The court in CSX explained: 
[The Short Party] is entitled to have the long party place it in the same economic 
position it would have occupied had it advanced the long party an amount equal to the 
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the Short Party will make payments based on the amount of any 
appreciation in the value of the Reference Securities, as well as the amount 
of any dividends or distributions paid with respect to the Reference 
Securities.30 Because equity swaps result in payments based on the return 
on a stock or stock index, they provide cash flows to the Long Party that 
mimic equity returns.31 Therefore, equity swaps can be used as substitutes 
for direct transactions in equity.32 These instruments give the Long Party 
exactly the same economic interest it would have if it actually purchased 
the stock or stock index.33 
B. SECTION 13(D) 
Section 13(d) was enacted as part of the Williams Act.34 This Act was 
passed in 1968 to close a gap in the securities laws by requiring disclosure 
of pertinent information where persons sought to gain corporate control of a 
company by a tender offer and through open market or privately negotiated 
purchases.35 Section 13(d) of the Act was enacted to “alert the marketplace 
                                                          
market value of the referenced security. But there are at least two salient distinctions, 
from the short party’s perspective, between a TRS and a loan. First, the short party does 
not actually advance the notional amount to the long party. Second, it is subject to the 
risk that the referenced asset will appreciate during the term of the TRS. 
See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 521. 
 30. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 520.  
Counterparty B, which may be referred to as the “total return receiver” or “guarantor” 
is entitled to receive from Counterparty A the sum of (1) any cash distributions, such as 
interest or dividends, that it would have received had it held the referenced asset, and 
(2) either (i) an amount equal to the market appreciation in the value of the referenced 
asset over the term of the swap (if the TRS is cash-settled) or, what is economically the 
same thing, (ii) the referenced asset in exchange for its value on the last refixing date 
prior to the winding up of the transaction (if the TRS is settled in kind). 
Id.  
 31. Id. at 521; see also Chance, supra note 27, at 78 (providing an example of “[a]n [e]quity 
[s]wap with the [e]quity [r]eturn [p]aid [a]gainst [a]nother [e]quity [r]eturn”). 
  In practical economic terms, a TRS referenced to stock places the long party in 
substantially the same economic position that it would occupy if it owned the 
referenced stock or security. There are two notable exceptions. First, since it does not 
have record ownership of the referenced shares, it does not have the right to vote them. 
Second, the long party looks to the short party, rather than to the issuer of the 
referenced security for distributions and the marketplace for any appreciation in value. 
CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 521.  
 32. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 521; see also Chance, supra note 27, at 78. 
 33. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 521; see also Chance, supra note 27, at 78.  
 34. Adoption of Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 
5808, Exchange Act Release No. 13,291, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,342, at 12,343 (Mar. 3, 1977) 
[hereinafter Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements Release]. 
 35. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: 
Hearing on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
90th Cong. 1 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Securities). 
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to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities, regardless of 
technique employed, which might represent a potential shift in corporate 
control.”36 The disclosure required by § 13(d) is aimed to help investors 
make informed investment decisions based on market prices that reflect an 
awareness of the required information.37 Section 13(d)(1) provides in 
pertinent part that: 
(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the 
beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered 
pursuant to section 78l of this title . . . is directly or indirectly the 
beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten 
days after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its 
principal executive office, by registered or certified mail, send to each 
exchange where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a 
statement containing [certain information].38 
Further, Rule 13(d)-1(a), which was promulgated by the Commission in 
1978 as a regulation under § 13(d),39 requires any person who acquires, 
either directly or indirectly, beneficial ownership of greater than 5% of a  
§ 12 registered equity voting security to file and disclose certain 
information.40 As such, the disclosure mandated by § 13(d) is only required 
when a person has beneficial ownership of the security. As stated by former 
Commission Chairman Manuel F. Cohen, “beneficial ownership is the test. 
                                                          
  At present, however, some areas remain where full disclosure is necessary for 
investor protection but not required. The legislation before the subcommittee today will 
close what I consider to be a significant gap in these last remaining areas. It requires the 
disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders where persons seek to obtain control 
of a corporation by: (1) a cash tender offer and (2) through open market or privately 
negotiated purchases of securities. Disclosure would also be required when 
corporations purchase their own stock in the open market. 
Id. 
 36. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 
(1972). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2006). 
 39. Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Beneficial Ownership, Securities Act 
Release No. 5925, Exchange Act Release No. 14,692, Investment Company Act Release No. 
10,212, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, at 18,484 (Apr. 28, 1978). 
 40. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2009). 
  (a) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of 
any equity security of a class which is specified in paragraph (i) of this section, is 
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than five percent of the class shall, 
within 10 days after the acquisition, file with the Commission, a statement containing 
the information required by Schedule 13D.  
Id. 
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[The acquiring entity] might try to get around it, and that would be a 
violation of law, but the legal requirement is beneficial ownership.”41 
The Commission has defined beneficial ownership in Rule 13d-3(a) to 
include any ownership where the person has voting or investment power 
over the securities.42 The Rule provides that: 
(a) For the purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Act a beneficial 
owner of a security includes any person who, directly or indirectly, 
through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or 
otherwise has or shares:  
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the 
voting of, such security; and/or,  
(2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct 
the disposition of, such security.43 
The Commission intended Rule 13d-3(a) to be a “broad definition” that 
would “obtain disclosure from all those persons who have the ability to 
change or influence control.”44 In this regard, the determination of 
beneficial ownership requires “[a]n analysis of all relevant facts and 
circumstances in a particular situation . . . in order to identify each person 
possessing the requisite voting power or investment power.”45 More than 
one person can have beneficial ownership of a security and may possess 
such ownership directly or indirectly.46 For example, if X owns 74% of Y 
Corporation and Y Corporation purchases 9% of Z Corporation, X is the 
indirect owner of the 9% interest in Z Corporation, while Y Corporation is 
the direct owner of the 9% interest.47  
                                                          
 41. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and Corporate Takeover Bids: 
Hearing on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Finance of the H. Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 40–41 (1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, 
Chairman, SEC).  
 42. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)(1)–(2) (2009). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Beneficial Ownership, Securities Act 
Release No. 5925, Exchange Act Release No. 14,692, Investment Company Act Release No. 
10,212, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, at 18,484 (Apr. 28, 1978).  
 45. See Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements Release, supra note 34, at 12,344. 
 46. See § 240.13d-3. 
 47. See Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements Release, supra note 34, at 12,346.  
  Example 1. Rule 13d-3(a), indirect ownership; Rule 13d-3(d)(i), option to acquire. X, 
an individual, beneficially owns sixty-eight percent of Y Corporation. Y Corporation 
purchases four percent of a class of securities of Z Corporation and also an option, 
exercisable within thirty days of the date of purchase, to purchase an additional two 
percent of the outstanding shares of the same class of Z corporation.  
  Question. Does X have a filing obligation and, if so, how may it be satisfied?   
  Interpretative Response. Yes, X has an obligation to file under Rule 13d-1 since 
under Rule 13d-3 he is the indirect beneficial owner of the Z shares held by Y 
Corporation due to his power to direct their voting or disposition. It should be noted 
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Beneficial ownership may arise through any contract, arrangement, 
understanding, relationship, or other means, and “does not require formal 
documentation of arrangements.”48 Essentially, a person is a beneficial 
owner if he has or shares voting rights or investment power.49 In order to 
“have” that power, the person must have such authority at the present time 
without the consent of another party and without another person having that 
power.50 A person shares such power if he and at least one other person can 
make decisions regarding the voting or disposition of the securities.51 With 
respect to voting power, it should be restricted to the ability to vote or to 
direct the vote.52 The power to vote means the person can vote himself, 
while the power to direct the vote means the person can instruct others how 
to vote.53 Investment power includes the power to dispose of, or to direct 
                                                          
that the operation of Rule 13d-3(d)(1)(i) puts X above the five percent threshold 
inasmuch as the shares subject to the option will be aggregated with those purchased. 
X’s reporting obligation may be satisfied with a filing by X disclosing his indirect 
ownership and the intermediaries involved; alternatively, since Y Corporation also 
would be subject to a separate filing requirement with respect to the same securities, X 
may file jointly with Y disclosing the control position and other information required 
with respect to X pursuant to Instruction C to Schedule 13D. 
Id.  
 48. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705, 721 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d, 890 F.2d 1215 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 49. § 240.13d-3. 
 50. See JACOBS, supra note 1.  
“Has” connotes the present power without the consent of another party and without 
another person also having that power. Thus, having the power subject to another’s 
consent is equivalent to not having the power at all. Having the power in the future is 
not having the present power, but beneficial ownership may exist under  
Rule 13d-3(d)(1)(i). 
Id. 
 51. Id.  
“Shares” the power means that the person in question and at least one other person can 
make the decision. Thus, each of three trustees of a trust “shares” the power over 
securities in the trust’s corpus, even though two of them can outvote the third. On the 
other hand, if one person has the legal power to vote (since he is the record holder) but 
another instructs him how to vote, the record holder does not share the power. Rather, 
the other person “has” the sole power. Thus, sharing the power means the person has a 
meaningful role (although not necessarily a decisive one) in exercising the power to 
vote or dispose of the security. “Shares” also connotes a present ability; one who in the 
future will share the power is not the beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(a), although he 
may be a beneficial owner pursuant to Rule 13d-3(d)(1)(i). 
Id. 
 52. Id. (“The voting power clause [states] ‘voting power which includes the power to vote, or 
to direct the voting.’ ‘Includes’ should be construed as ‘means.’ Accordingly, voting power 
should be restricted to ‘the power to vote or to direct the vote.’”). But see CSX Corp. v. Children’s 
Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) L.L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 539–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. App’x 
133 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the plain language of the statute to set forth a standard whereby it is 
sufficient that the party has the ability to influence the voting or disposition of the securities). 
 53. See JACOBS, supra note 1. 
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the disposition of a security, and it is properly restricted to the words of the 
statute.54 
The other way in which a person can have beneficial ownership is 
under Rule 13(d)-3(b).55 This Rule provides that: 
(b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, [1] creates or uses a trust, 
proxy, power of attorney, pooling arrangement or any other contract, 
arrangement, or device [2] with the purpose or effect of divesting such 
person of beneficial ownership of a security or preventing the vesting of 
such beneficial ownership [3] as part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
reporting requirements of section 13(d) or (g) of the Act shall be deemed 
for purposes of such sections to be the beneficial owner of such security.56 
In adopting the Rule, the Commission gave an example of a transaction 
that would violate § 13(d) involving stock parking,57 an arrangement which, 
according to one court, is “a concealment of stock ownership achieved by 
placing the stock in an account in the name of a third party.”58 The 
Commission provided the following example: 
In order to acquire a substantial position in the voting securities of Z 
Corporation prior to the election of directors which will take place in the 
near future, X causes ten institutions to each acquire three percent of the 
outstanding shares of Z Corporation. None of the institutions are aware of 
the purchases by the other institutions or of X’s control objective. As an 
attempted means of avoiding disclosure of his beneficial ownership of the 
Z shares until a short time before the election, X, simultaneously with the 
purchase of the Z shares, gives an irrevocable proxy to A, which proxy 
will lapse according to its terms . . . . A is a beneficial owner of the Z 
shares subject to the proxy due to his power to vote them and therefore he 
must report such ownership pursuant to Rule 13d-1, as well as information 
about X under Item 6 of Schedule 13D. In addition, as indicated in Rule 
13d-3(b), X is also deemed a beneficial owner of the same Z shares for the 
period of the proxy as well as thereafter, and therefore must file a 
Schedule 13D.59 
Aside from stock parking, Commission pronouncements and court 
decisions have not focused on Rule 13(d)-3(b) until the CSX decision.60 
                                                          
 54. Id.  
 55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b) (2009). 
 56. Id.  
 57. See Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements Release, supra note 34, at 12,348. 
 58. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705, 720 (D.D.C. 1988), aff’d, 890 F.2d 1215 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 59. See Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements Release, supra note 34, at 12,348. 
 60. See JACOBS, supra note 1, § 2:13.  
This provision has received little notice from the cases and SEC pronouncements. 
Some cases and a series of SEC releases do no more in substance than merely 
acknowledge its existence. Another case stated that deliberate efforts to conceal legal 
ownership do not affect the determination of beneficial ownership . . .  
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C. DECOUPLING AND HIDDEN MORPHABLE OWNERSHIP 
Decoupling occurs when the voting rights of a security or the 
investment power over the security are separated from the economic 
interest in the security.61 While there are a number of ways to decouple 
voting rights and investment power from economic ownership,62 this 
Article focuses on the use of equity swaps whereby a person with a long 
position in the swap acquires economic ownership of the shares while the 
Short Party retains the voting rights and investment power over the 
securities (assuming that the Short Party has hedged with Matched 
Shares).63 The ownership of the shares is “hidden” in that the Long Party 
does not have to disclose his economic interest under § 13(d).64 In this 
regard, practitioners and the SECs Division of Corporation Finance agree 
that a Long Party does not have beneficial ownership under Rule 13(d)-3(a) 
unless he has the power to vote or to sell the securities, either pursuant to 
the swap’s contractual terms or pursuant to another understanding or 
arrangement with the Short Party.65 Consequently, a party to a cash-settled 
swap that has no § 13(d) reporting obligation may acquire a substantial long 
position in the security without having to file a Schedule 13D.66 However, 
if the person beneficially owns physical shares in excess of 5%, he becomes 
subject to § 13(d) reporting and disclosure issues regarding the swap under 
                                                          
  . . . [The Rule] is a good failsafe but is not an important weapon in a plaintiff’s 
arsenal.  
Id. The only case other than CSX to even discuss the Rule in any detail is Levy v. Southbrook Int’l. 
Invs., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 14–18 (2d Cir. 2001). In that case, “the Second Circuit held that a cap on 
the right to convert a derivative security to, say, 4.9% of the outstanding stock, is not a sham and 
will be respected.” JACOBS, supra note 1, § 2:13; see also Levy, 263 F.3d at 18. 
 61. See Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 811. (“[T]he derivatives revolution and other capital 
markets developments now allow both outside investors and insiders to readily decouple 
economic ownership of shares from voting rights.”). 
 62. Id. at 816.  
One method relies on the share lending market, which lets one investor “borrow” shares 
from another. Under standard lending arrangements, the borrower has voting rights but 
no economic ownership, while the lender has economic ownership without voting 
rights. . . . Other decoupling strategies are also possible, such as relying on put and call 
options or, where they exist, single-stock futures.  
Id. 
 63. Id. at 816.  
 64. Id. at 816, 825 & 868. 
 65. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.02[1].  
 66. Id.   
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several Items of Schedule 13D.67 Specifically, Item 6 requires the 
disclosure of equity swap contracts.68 
A person who avoids § 13(d) disclosure by holding long positions in 
equity swaps has hidden morphable ownership if such ownership includes 
the power to direct the voting of the shares by the Short Party, or the ability 
to conduct an exchange unwind and acquire the Matched Shares.69 While 
Long Parties typically do not have the power to direct the voting of the 
shares, and do not give explicit direction to Short Parties because such 
instructions would likely trigger disclosure under § 13(d),70 the Long Party 
can choose to enter into an equity swap with a dealer whom it believes will 
vote the shares in the way it desires. For example, a person may enter into 
an equity swap with a dealer that owns a hedge fund with a large 
investment in the company subject to the swap and, therefore, has similar 
investment objectives as the Long Party. Also, dealers have significant 
economic incentives to vote the shares in the manner the Long Party desires 
because they want to obtain the client’s business, including potentially 
receiving large prime brokerage fees.71 However, the market practice is that 
dealers make their own voting decisions without consulting the swap 
counterparties.72  
                                                          
 67. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2009) (for example, he would face Item 3—
Source and Amount of Funds or Other Consideration; Item 4—Purpose of Transaction; Item 5—
Interest in Securities of the Issuer; Item 6—Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or 
Relationships with Respect to Securities of the Issuer; and Item 7—Material to be Filed Exhibits); 
see also GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.02[1] (discussing disclosure).  
 68. § 240.13d-101. Item 6 requires the person to:  
Describe any contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships (legal or 
otherwise) among the persons named in Item 2 and between such persons and any 
person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to transfer 
or voting of any of the securities, finder’s fees, joint ventures, loan or option 
arrangements, puts or calls, guarantees of profits, division of profits or loss, or the 
giving or withholding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, 
arrangements, understandings or relationships have been entered into. Include such 
information for any of the securities that are pledged or otherwise subject to a 
contingency the occurrence of which would give another person voting power or 
investment power over such securities except that disclosure of standard default and 
similar provisions contained in loan agreements need not be included.  
Id. 
 69. See Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 826 (“These ‘morphable voting rights’ will generally not 
be verifiable by outsiders, and depend on market customs.”).  
 70. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 8 (“Market practice for U.S. companies, which has 
developed in part because of § 13(d) rules, is for the dealer to make its own voting decisions, 
without consulting its swap counterparties.”). 
 71. See Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 815. 
 72. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 8.  
I am not aware of a market practice with respect to whether it is appropriate for a swap 
counterparty to contact a dealer and attempt to persuade it to vote in a particular way. 
Such efforts may exist, especially for non-U.S. companies, but they are not the norm 
for U.S. companies and did not occur in this case. If such attempts were made, they 
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For example, dealers simply may vote in proportion to what they 
understand others’ votes to be or follow the recommendations of 
RiskMetrics, a proxy advisory firm.73 Others may aggregate and “net-off” 
share positions among multiple trading desks such that the dealer actually 
has a net short position and thus no voting rights.74 Further, some dealers 
may have a policy of not voting the shares, at least in contested situations, 
or they may be unable to do so because they have lent the shares to third 
parties under an agreement that transfers the voting rights to the borrower.75 
Thus, even though there are circumstances where the Long Party can 
influence the voting of the Short Party, in the majority of situations, this is 
not the case. 
A Long Party may have voting power because of its ability to conduct 
an exchange unwind. This can occur when the Short Party hedges its 
exposure by acquiring the underlying shares.76 A derivatives dealer who 
acts as the Short Party for equity swaps often hedges its positions by 
purchasing shares in the open market.77 This is especially the case where 
the swap involves a large number of shares of a thinly-traded company 
where alternative hedging strategies may be limited.78 However, there is no 
guarantee that the Short Party will hedge in this manner, as hedging 
strategies vary among dealers.79 In fact, swap dealers’ hedging practices are 
                                                          
may fail because there is no direct contact between the dealer’s swaps desk and the 
persons who make voting decisions, or because the dealer has a policy against 
responding to such efforts. It is possible that such an effort may backfire by causing the 
dealer to abstain from voting. 
Id. 
 73. Brief of Amici Curiae International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. and Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association at 21–25, CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. 
(UK) L.L.P. (2d Cir. July 18, 2008) (No. 08-2899) [hereinafter ISDA Brief]. 
 74. Id. at 24–25. 
 75. See generally SIFMA, Master Securities Loan Agreement (2000), http://www.sifma.org/ 
services/stdforms/pdf/master_securities_loan_agreement_2000_version.pdf. 
 76. See Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 838 (“Holding matched shares to hedge an equity swap 
may be a preferred strategy when the client is concerned with governance, precisely because 
doing so lends itself to vote morphing.”). 
 77. Id. But derivatives dealers may hedge their positions by other means. See generally 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE: 
CONSULTATION AND DRAFT HANDBOOK TEXT, 2007, CP07/20, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
cp/cp07_20.pdf. 
 78. Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 837.  
 79. See ISDA Brief, supra note 73, at 11.  
In most cases, the derivatives dealer will hedge its short equity swap position. When 
hedging occurs, it often (but not always) involves the purchasing of “matched shares.” 
For example, a dealer might take the short side of an equity swap referencing 1,000,000 
shares of CSX, and at or very close to the same time, purchase 1,000,000 CSX shares in 
the market. If the dealer is fully hedged and CSX shares then rise (fall), the dealer will 
lose (gain) on the swap exactly the same amount it gains (loses) on matched shares.  
Other forms of hedging include acquiring a long position in single stock futures, 
acquiring a (long call option, short put option) position, and acquiring a long position in 
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far from uniform and many dealers hedge their exposure on a portfolio 
basis, rather than swap-by-swap.80 Further, while some dealers may be 
willing to sell the shares to the party via an exchange unwind, some have a 
policy of not doing so, and, in any case, they are not obligated to do so.81 In 
addition, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s equity 
swap documentation and any dealer-specific supplements, which are used 
for nearly all swaps, do not give the Long Party any power to direct the 
actions of the dealer with respect to whether the dealer will hedge with 
Matched Shares. Furthermore, if the dealer does decide to hedge, no 
guidance is provided concerning how the dealer will vote or dispose of the 
Matched Shares.82 Thus, while there are circumstances where the Long 
                                                          
another equity swap referencing the same company’s shares. The dealer will choose 
whichever hedging method is most economically attractive. Under current market 
conditions, for sizeable equity swaps, the cheapest means of hedging is usually to 
acquire matched shares. Smaller positions may be hedge in other ways or left 
unhedged, and hedges of large positions may be incomplete. 
Black Letter, supra note 11, at 7–8. 
 80. ROBERT L. TORTORIELLO & PAUL E. GLOTZER, GUIDE TO BANK UNDERWRITING, 
DEALING AND BROKERAGE ACTIVITIES § II(E)(3)(c) (14th ed. 2009) (summarizing interpretive 
letters from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency describing various hedging practices, 
including hedging on a portfolio basis). 
 81. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 9.  
Dealers’ practices with respect to exchange unwinds differ. Some dealers, if they have 
hedged with matched shares, are willing to sell the shares directly to their investor, if 
the investor requests this. Other dealers, as a matter of policy, will refuse to sell 
matched shares directly to the swap counterparty.  
Investor preferences with respect to exchange unwinds also differ. Some investors may 
ask their dealer whether the dealer holds matched shares and is interested in selling the 
shares to the investor. Others may prefer not to even make such an inquiry, partly to 
limit market knowledge of their positions, and partly to avoid any inference that they 
had a prior agreement with the dealer with respect to the possible unwind. 
Id. Moreover,  
[m]arket expectation that a dealer will unwind a swap is not a guarantee, as illustrated 
by a 2006 buyout offer by Sears Holdings for the minority shares in its Sears Canada 
subsidiary. A hedge fund had previously acquired equity swaps in Sears Canada from 
Scotiabank. Scotiabank later became the dealer-manager for Sears Holdings’ buyout 
offer. The offer required approval by a majority of the Sears Canada minority 
shareholders. Sears Canada’s independent directors opposed the bid; so did many Sears 
Canada shareholders. The hedge fund asked Scotiabank to unwind the swap so it could 
vote against the offer. Scotiabank not only refused, but also committed to vote its Sears 
Canada shares for the offer. Scotiabank thus became an empty voter; perhaps with 
negative economic interest because it was an agent for Sears Holdings. The hedge fund 
complained about Scotiabank’s failure to observe swap market conventions and said it 
was “looking forward to regulatory and legal scrutiny of this transaction.” 
Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 839 (internal citations omitted). 
 82. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 8.  
The ISDA equity swap documentation and any dealer-specific supplements do not give 
a long equity swap holder any power to direct: (i) whether the derivatives dealer will 
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Party to an equity swap can acquire the underlying shares and obtain voting 
power, there are situations where this is not the case. 
The Long Party may have investment power where the Short Party has 
no other means to hedge, because by entering into the swap, the Long Party 
is essentially directing the Short Party to hedge by purchasing the 
underlying shares.83 By unwinding the swap, the Long Party essentially has 
the power to direct the Short Party to sell the shares, as Short Parties 
typically sell their hedged shares when the Long Party unwinds the swap.84 
The Long Party may have the ability to acquire the physical shares upon the 
unwinding of the swap, as the dealer may be willing to sell the shares to the 
Long Party or the Long Party may simply purchase the shares in the open 
market.85 Under circumstances where the Short Party has no means to 
hedge other than by buying the underlying shares, and such party plans to 
sell those shares upon the unwinding of the swap, the Long Party 
essentially has investment power over the security. However, market 
realities are such that the Short Party does not always purchase the 
underlying shares to hedge its position in the swap and does not always sell 
the underlying shares when the Long Party unwinds the swap.86 Further, 
even dealers that hedge with Matched Shares may sell them prior to the 
unwinding of the equity swap or may hold on to them after the swap is 
unwound.87 Thus, even though there are circumstances where the Long 
                                                          
hedge; (ii) if the dealer hedges, how it does so, with matched shares or in another way; 
(iii) if the dealer hedges by acquiring matched shares, whether the counterparty will 
hold those shares on the record date for a shareholder meeting, or will instead lend the 
shares to others on that date[;] (iv) if the dealer hedges with matched shares and holds 
them on a record date, whether the counterparty will vote the shares at the shareholder 
meeting; or (v) if the counterparty hedges with shares, holds those shares on the record 
date, and votes the shares, how the counterparty will vote. The dealer-specific 
addendum will sometimes specifically state that some or all of these matters are in the 
sole discretion of the dealer. 
Id. 
 83. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 546 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 84. Id. at 542 (“With very minor exceptions, whenever TCI terminated a swap, the 
counterparty sold the same number of physical shares that were referenced in the unwound swap 
and it did so on the same day that the swap was terminated.”). However, “[m]arket expectation 
that a dealer will unwind a swap is not a guarantee.” See Hu & Black, supra note 4, at 839. 
 85. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 9. 
 86. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 87. See ISDA Brief, supra note 73, at 23. Examples of where this might occur include:  
[1] Where a swap dealer has offsetting swaps, it may simply dispose of the initially 
established hedges (to the extent they set off), in order to reduce transaction costs  
[2] Where traders decide to take a market “view” on particular shares, market segments 
or the market in general, they may adjust share holdings that were initially acquired as a 
hedge, thereby taking on, rather than hedging, exposure. 
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Party has the power to influence the disposition of the security, there are 
situations where this is not the case. 
III. CSX CORP. V. CHILDREN’S INVESTMENT FUND 
MANAGEMENT 
A. FACTS OF THE CASE 
TCI is an activist88 hedge fund that buys large enough stakes in 
companies to bring about changes in the direction of the companies.89 
Likewise, in October 2006, TCI began acquiring long positions in total 
return equity swaps in CSX because it thought that if it could influence the 
company to make certain changes, the value of its positions would 
increase.90 By the end of 2006, TCI had acquired 8.8% of CSX.91 Beginning 
in December 2006, TCI explored the possibility of a leveraged buyout.92 In 
February 2007, CSX announced a plan to repurchase some of its stock in an 
effort to defend itself against a potential takeover.93 Accordingly, TCI 
began contacting other hedge funds, attempting to influence them to acquire 
shares in CSX in order to build support for whatever course of action TCI 
would decide to take with respect to its ownership in the company.94 In 
accordance with this plan, 3G, one of the funds contacted by TCI, began 
purchasing shares in CSX.95 As of March 29, 2007, TCI owned equity 
swaps referencing nearly 14% of CSX stock, but had yet to purchase any of 
the company’s shares directly.96 
In March and April of 2007, TCI began to acquire physical shares of 
CSX.97 At this point, a leveraged buyout was becoming a less likely 
                                                          
[3] Where traders “cross-hedge” using one security, or an index of securities, as a 
surrogate for another, or hedge positions in multiple securities with a single listed or 
unlisted derivative on an index of securities.   
Id.  
 88. See Dieter G. Kaiser, Activists, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 5 
(Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2009). “The investment process of an activist begins with fundamental 
analysis to identify companies [that are undervalued].” Id. The activist will then engage in either a 
friendly or a hostile strategy. Id. A fund using a friendly strategy will have private 
communications with management in an effort to effect change in the company that will increase 
shareholder value. Id. Alternatively, or after friendly tactics are unsuccessful, the activist may use 
a hostile strategy, such as waging a proxy contest or threatening and/or engaging in a change in 
control transaction. Id. at 5–6. 
 89. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
 90. Id. at 523.  
 91. Id. at 524.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 553. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 526.  
 97. Id. at 527.  
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alternative because CSX had shown little interest in it.98 Consequently, TCI 
explored the possibility of a proxy fight as a means to effect the changes in 
CSX that it desired.99 By holding the actual shares as opposed to swaps, 
TCI had the ability to vote the shares.100 In August 2007, TCI met with a 
proxy solicitation firm to discuss the mechanics of a proxy contest,101 and in 
October 2007, TCI began to identify potential director nominees.102 In 
November 2007, TCI began unwinding its swap positions with six of its 
eight counterparties and shifted its positions to Citigroup and Deutsche 
Bank in part because it believed that such firms may vote the same way as 
TCI in a proxy contest.103 In this regard, Deutsche Bank owned a hedge 
fund, Austin Friars Capital, which had a proprietary position in CSX.104 
Austin Friars Capital consulted with TCI on multiple occasions about the 
direction that CSX should take to maximize shareholder value.105 
As noted, 3G began purchasing CSX stock in February 2007.106 By 
October 2007, 3G owned a combination of physical shares and positions in 
swaps amounting to 4.2% of CSX.107 The economic exposure of 3G to CSX 
never exceeded 4.9% of CSX stock.108 In anticipation of a proxy fight, 3G 
began searching for potential nominees to the board of CSX, and two 
nominees were secured by December 2007.109 On December 10, 2007, TCI, 
3G, and their director nominees (collectively, the Group) filed a Schedule 
13D disclosing that they were going to engage in a proxy solicitation.110 
The Group then filed a notice of intent to nominate a minority slate of five 
directors to the board of CSX, which was comprised of twelve directors.111 
The Group supplemented its notice to include a bylaw that would allow 
shareholders owning 15% of CSX stock to call a special meeting.112 CSX 
filed a preliminary proxy statement in February 2008 and the group filed its 
proxy statement on March 10, 2008.113 
                                                          
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 528. 
 102. Id. at 535. 
 103. Id. at 529–30. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 532.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 535.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 536. 
 112. Id. at 537.  
 113. Id. 
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B. RULINGS IN THE CASE 
CSX filed suit on March 17, 2008 alleging that TCI violated § 13(d) by 
failing to timely disclose its beneficial ownership of the shares of CSX 
stock referenced in the total return swaps and claiming that TCI was a 
beneficial owner of such shares under Rules 13d-3(a) and 13d-3(b).114 CSX 
also alleged that TCI and 3G had formed a § 13(d) group ten months prior 
to filing a Schedule 13D.115 
The court did not decide the question of whether the ownership of the 
swaps by TCI constituted beneficial ownership under the definition in Rule 
13d-3(a), but did offer its view that such a position likely did.116 It found 
that “[i]n the last analysis there are substantial reasons for concluding that 
TCI is the beneficial owner of the CSX shares held as hedges by its short 
counterparties.”117 
With respect to whether TCI had voting power under Rule 13d-3(a), the 
court found that “[i]n the last analysis, the question whether there was an 
agreement-explicit or implicit-between Deutsche Bank and TCI with 
respect to the voting of the shares is a close one.”118 However, the court 
explained that “there nevertheless is reason to believe that TCI was in a 
position to influence the counterparties, especially Deutsche Bank, with 
respect to the exercise of their voting rights.”119 The court reasoned that 
TCI moved its shares to Deutsche Bank because it believed it could 
influence the voting of the Matched Shares.120 This belief was based in part 
on the fact that Austin Friars Capital was owned by Deutsche Bank, held a 
proprietary position in CSX, and, as of March 2007, shared a common 
interest in taking the railroad private.121 The court also speculated that 
Deutsche Bank may have recalled loans of shares around the record date so 
that it would be entitled to vote them in a manner favorable to TCI, 
evidenced by the reloaning of the shares immediately after the record 
date.122 The court also found that TCI potentially had the power to influence 
how the counterparties voted the shares by selecting banks with certain 
voting policies.123 While there may not have been an explicit agreement or 
understanding between TCI and the banks with respect to the voting of the 
shares, the court found that there was enough evidence, especially with 
                                                          
 114. Id. at 538.  
 115. Id. at 538–39.  
 116. Id. at 545–48.  
 117. Id. at 545.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 546.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 544.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 544.  
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respect to Deutsche Bank, that TCI had the power to influence the voting of 
the securities, although it did not decide this question.124 
With respect to whether TCI had investment power, the court found 
that TCI contemplated and intended that the counterparties would hedge the 
swaps by purchasing shares in CSX and that it was inevitable that the 
counterparties would hedge in this manner.125 It further reasoned that “TCI 
significantly influenced the banks to purchase the CSX shares that 
constituted their hedges because the banks, as a practical matter and as TCI 
both knew and desired, were compelled to do so.”126 The court reasoned 
that “once the counterparties bought the shares, TCI had the practical ability 
to cause them to sell simply by unwinding the swap transactions.”127 Thus, 
while TCI did not explicitly direct the banks to purchase or sell the hedged 
shares, the court found that TCI had investment power, although it 
technically did not decide this question.128 
The court, however, did decide the question of whether TCI was a 
beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(b),129 holding that “TCI created and 
used the TRSs with the purpose and effect of preventing the vesting of 
beneficial ownership in TCI as part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
reporting requirements of Section 13(d).”130 The court found that “[u]nder 
the plain language of Rule 13d-3(b), [TCI] is deemed to be a beneficial 
owner of the shares held by its counterparties to hedge their short exposures 
created by the TRSs.”131 The court reasoned that TCI purposely remained 
below the 5% disclosure requirement for its ownership of physical shares 
and made certain that its counterparties stayed below 5% in order to avoid 
the filing of a Schedule 13D on behalf of itself or its counterparties.132 The 
court explained that TCI acted in such a manner to avoid paying a higher 
price for CSX shares.133 It further found that avoiding disclosure allowed 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 542.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 543. The court noted that: 
[W]hile there theoretically are means of hedging that do not require the purchase of 
physical shares, in the situation before the Court it is perfectly clear that the purchase of 
physical shares was the only practical alternative. Indeed, TCI effectively has admitted 
as much. It did so by spreading its swap transactions among eight counterparties to 
avoid any one hitting the 5 percent disclosure threshold and thus triggering its own 
reporting obligation—a concern that was relevant only because TCI knew that the 
counterparties were hedging by buying shares. And it did so in closing argument, where 
its counsel said that the banks’ purchases of CSX shares were “the natural 
consequence” of the swap transactions. 
Id. at 546.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 552.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 548–49.  
 133. Id. 
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TCI to exert pressure on CSX without providing the market or the company 
with complete information.134  
In interpreting the amicus letter from the SECs Division of Corporation 
Finance, the court easily found that Rule 13d-3(b) applies “when one enters 
into a transaction with the intent to create the false appearance that there is 
no large accumulation of securities that might have . . . potential for shifting 
corporate control by evading the disclosure requirements of [§] 13(d) or (g) 
through preventing the vesting of beneficial ownership in the actor.”135 
Further, the court dismissed Professor Bernard Black’s argument that, in 
order for Rule 13d-3(b) to apply, the underlying evasive activity must 
constitute beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a).136 It reasoned that 
“[a]s Rule 13d-3(b) is reasonably related to the purpose of the statute, it is a 
perfectly appropriate exercise of the Commission’s authority even where it 
reaches arrangements that otherwise would not amount to beneficial 
ownership” and that “[i]f Rule 13d-3(b) reaches only situations that involve 
beneficial ownership, then it reaches only situations that are reached by 
Rule 13d-3(a) [which would] render Rule 13d-3(b) superfluous.”137 
The court also held that TCI and 3G formed a § 13(d) group ten months 
prior to filing a Schedule 13D.138 Section 13(d)(3) provides that “[w]hen 
two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or 
other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities 
of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a ‘person’ . . . .”139 
The court reasoned that “the existing relationship, the admitted exchanges 
of views and information regarding CSX, 3G’s striking patterns of share 
purchases immediately following meetings with Hohn and Amin [partners 
at TCI], and the parallel proxy fight preparations, all suggest that the 
parties’ activities from at least as early as February 13, 2007, were products 
of concerted action. . . .”140 Consequently, the court held that the physical 
shares acquired by TCI and 3G between February and December 2007 were 
obtained when the parties should have filed a Schedule 13D, and, thus, the 
funds were in violation of § 13(d).141 This Article maintains that this 
holding was correct based on the overwhelming evidence suggesting that 
the parties formed a group142 and, therefore, provides no further analysis of 
this particular holding.  
                                                          
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 550.  
 136. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 5. 
 137. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 552.  
 138. Id. at 558. 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2006). 
 140. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 
 141. Id. at 552–54. The court noted that “[d]efendants most recently held 8.3 percent of CSX’s 
shares. Of that total, 1.9 percent were acquired by 3G before its disclosure obligation arose upon 
the expiration of 10 days following the formation of a group with TCI no later than February 13, 
2007.” Id. at 568 n.314.  
 142. Id. at 553. This evidence includes that:  
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As relief, among other requested remedies, CSX sought an injunction 
prohibiting TCI and 3G from voting any CSX shares at the 2008 annual 
meeting, including those shares obtained when in violation of § 13(d), 
which amounted to approximately 6.4% of CSX’s outstanding shares.143 To 
obtain an injunction, a moving party such as CSX has to show success on 
the merits and irreparable harm if the relief is not granted.144 Furthermore, 
according to the Supreme Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Article Corp., for  
§ 13(d) actions the irreparable harm must be caused to those interests that 
the Section seeks to protect, such as alerting investors to potential changes 
in corporate control.145 CSX showed success on the merits because the court 
found that, among other things, “TCI and 3G failed to file the required 
disclosure within [ten] days of forming a group.”146 Thus, the critical issue 
was whether CSX could show irreparable harm. 
In attempting to show irreparable harm, CSX made two arguments.147 
The first was that TCI and 3G should have been foreclosed from voting the 
                                                          
TCI and 3G have had a close relationship for years, in part because 3G’s Synergy Fund 
is an investor in TCI.  
January 2007—Hohn and Behring discuss TCI’s investment in CSX, including its 
approximate size.  
February 2007—3G begins buying CSX shortly after Behring’s January conversation 
with Hohn.  
On or about February 13, 2007—Hohn speaks to his “friend Alex” Behring about CSX 
as a result of market excitement regarding CSX attributable in whole or part to 3G’s 
heavy buying.  
At about the same time, Hohn begins tipping other funds to CSX, which continues for 
some time. This is an effort to steer CSX shares into the hands of like-minded 
associates.  
March 29, 2007—Amin and Behring meet.  
March 29, 2007—3G resumes CSX purchases after hiatus.  
March 29, 2007 through April 18, 2007—TCI increases its overall (shares plus swaps) 
position by 5.5 million shares, or 1.2 percent of CSX. 3G increases its position by 11.1 
million shares, or 2.5 percent of CSX.  
August to September 2007—Hohn becomes concerned about possible reregulation. 
Both 3G and TCI reduce their CSX exposures, although 3G to a proportionately greater 
extent than TCI.  
Late September—October 2007—TCI tells D.F. King it probably will mount proxy 
contest. Hohn and Behring meet on September 26, 2007. Both TCI and 3G resume 
increasing their positions in the wake of the meeting. Both begin looking for director 
nominees. 
Id.  
 143. Id. at 568. 
 144. Id. at 567. 
 145. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). 
 146. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 568. 
 147. Id.  
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shares they acquired during the period in which they were in violation of  
§ 13(d) because failing to enjoin the votes would result in irreparable injury 
to shareholders who may have been content with present management.148 
The court found CSX’s argument unpersuasive, partly because corrective 
disclosure had already been made.149 It also reasoned that while the actions 
of TCI and 3G altered the corporate electorate, their conduct did no more 
than increase the funds’ likelihood of prevailing in the current contest, and 
could not be regarded as causing irreparable injury that could be properly 
remedied by the sterilization of votes.150 
The second argument made by CSX was that sterilization was required 
“to avoid permitted defendants [from] retain[ing] the fruits of their 
violations and to deter future violations.”151 Some courts have suggested 
that relief beyond corrective disclosure is appropriate to deter violations, 
and they typically consider “(1) whether a substantial number of shares 
were purchased after the misleading disclosures and before corrective 
disclosure, (2) whether the curative disclosure occurred simultaneously 
with or on the eve of a tender offer, and (3) whether the violation was 
egregious.”152 The Commission advanced such a position in its amicus brief 
in San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Investment Trust of 
America, suggesting that “[a]bsent a remedy beyond ordering corrective 
disclosure, a person will have little incentive to comply with the statute.”153 
However, the court in CSX did not find such an argument persuasive and 
ruled that it was foreclosed by Rondeau.154 In doing so, it held that “a threat 
of irreparable injury is essential to obtain an injunction sterilizing any of 
defendants’ voting rights and that plaintiff has failed to establish such a 
threat.”155  
IV. CRITIQUES OF THE RULINGS IN CSX AND PROPOSALS 
FOR REFORM 
A. LONG PARTIES TO EQUITY SWAPS ARE NOT BENEFICIAL 
OWNERS UNDER RULE 13D-3(A) 
Rule 13d-3 provides that a person beneficially owns a security if he 
directly or indirectly has or shares voting or investment power through any 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 568–69.  
 149. Id. at 569–71.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 568.  
 152. Id. at 571 (quoting S.F. Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 
1000, 1009 (1st Cir. 1983)).  
 153. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 36, S.F. Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. 
Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1983) (No. 82-1853) [hereinafter San Francisco SEC 
Amicus Brief]; see also Gen. Steel Indus., Inc. v. Walco Nat’l Corp., SEC Litig. Release No. 
9533, 24 SEC Docket 439 (Dec. 21, 1981). 
 154. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 571–72. 
 155. Id. at 572.  
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contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise.156 A 
holder of a long position in an equity swap does not have beneficial 
ownership of the security because he has neither voting nor investment 
power over the security.157 
The first reason that Long Parties to equity swaps do not have 
beneficial ownership over the shares held by the Short Party is because the 
definition of beneficial ownership does not extend to purely economic 
interests.158 According to the Staff of the SEC Division of Corporation 
Finance (the Staff), “economic or business incentives, in contrast to some 
contract, arrangement, understanding, or relationship concerning voting 
power or investment power between the parties to an equity swap, are not 
sufficient to create beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3.”159 Moreover, 
practitioners share the same view.160 In this regard, a standard cash-settled 
swap does not give the Long Party voting or investment power over the 
Matched Shares, absent a contract, arrangement, understanding, or 
relationship concerning voting or investment power.161 The Long Party 
merely has “an economic interest in the market performance of the 
referenced security, including any dividends or other distributions 
associated with it.”162 Thus, even though the Short Party may have 
economic or business incentives to vote the shares as the Long Party 
wishes, or to sell the shares upon the unwinding of the swap, the Long Party 
does not have actual authority to direct the voting or disposition of the 
securities.163 In this regard, the Long Party essentially owns the economic 
equivalent of nonvoting shares, which are not required to be disclosed 
under § 13(d).164 Further, “when the counterparty chooses to act in these 
areas in circumstances where it is unconstrained by either legal rights held 
by the other party or by any understanding, arrangement or restricting 
                                                          
 156. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2009). 
 157. See generally GREENE ET AL., supra note 1. A long position is the “purchase of securities 
by an investor with the hope there will be an increase in price allowing an investor to recognize a 
profit from the eventual sale of the securities.” MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (3d ed. 2001). 
 158. See Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Beneficial Ownership, Exchange Act 
Release No. 15,348, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,762 (Nov. 22, 1978). In 
the adopting release, the Commission declined to include “traditional economic interests in 
securities, i.e., the right to receive dividends and the right to receive proceeds upon sale” as 
“criteria for defining beneficial ownership for purposes of Regulation 13D-G.” Id. 
 159. See Breheny Letter, supra note 1, at 2.  
 160. See JACOBS, supra note 1, § 2:13. 
 161. See Breheny Letter, supra note 1, at 2. 
 162. Brief of Amicus Curiae Managed Funds Association in Support of Neither Party 4, CSX 
Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) L.L.P., 292 F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 
2764) [hereinafter Managed Funds Association Brief]. 
 163. Id.  
 164. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 17. 
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relationship with the other party, it is acting independently and in its own 
economic interests.”165 
Because the swap agreement between TCI and its counterparties 
contained no contract, understanding, arrangement, or relationship 
concerning voting or investment power, TCI is not the beneficial owner of 
the Matched Shares under Rule 13d-3(a). Further, since the mere presence 
of economic incentives to vote or dispose of securities does not fall within 
the definition of beneficial ownership contained in this Rule,166 TCI did not 
possess voting or investment power over the securities. As most swap 
agreements are similar to those entered into by TCI,167 most Long Parties to 
equity swaps do not have beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a). 
The second reason that a Long Party to an equity swap does not have 
beneficial ownership over the shares held by the Short Party is because the 
mere ability to influence another party is insufficient to establish beneficial 
ownership.168 In this regard, the court in CSX is incorrect in its view that 
Rule 13d-3(a) extends to persons who can merely influence the voting or 
disposition of the securities.169 Beneficial ownership requires control over 
                                                          
 165. Breheny Letter, supra note 1, at 2. 
 166. Managed Funds Association Brief, supra note 162.  
 167. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 7.  
Equity swaps are in theory privately negotiated contracts. However, the principal terms 
of the vast majority of equity swaps are based on documentation published by the 
International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA). Some dealers use supplements to the 
standard ISDA equity swaps form, but the principal terms of these supplements are 
standardized and not individually negotiated with each client. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 168. ISDA Brief, supra note 73. 
 169. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 548–49. ISDA’s amicus brief explained: 
  In the 1978 Release, the SEC stated that “[t]he legislative history of [§ 13(d)] 
indicates that it was intended to provide information to the public and the affected 
issuer about rapid accumulations of its equity securities in the hands of persons who 
would then have the potential to change or influence control of the issuer,” not the 
potential to ‘influence’ (but not control) the voting of the securities. 1978 Release, 43 
Fed. Reg. at 18,484 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the 1977 Release, the SEC used the 
term “influence” to emphasize that the purpose of determining beneficial ownership 
under Section 13(d) was to identify the party . . . . 
ISDA Brief, supra note 73, at 17. The brief further stated: 
The district court’s reliance on the 1981 Release was also misplaced. SPA-55, 62. The 
court cited to a footnote in the release - focused on Section 16(a) - stating that “[w]hile 
the concepts of beneficial ownership under Section 16(a) and under Rule 13d-3 have 
much in common, the former stresses the economic benefit to be derived from the 
securities and the latter emphasizes the ability to control or influence the voting or 
disposition of shares.” 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,149 n. 17. This passing observation about 
Section 13 in a release devoted to rules promulgated under Section 16 is not enough to 
overcome the Rule’s plain language and Congress’ statutory scheme as set forth in 
Section 13(d), not to mention the clearly contradictory releases [adopted release].   
Id. at 18 n.5.  
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the voting or disposition of the shares because “the terms ‘voting power’ 
and ‘investment power’ as used in the Rule . . . are based on the concept of 
the actual authority to vote or dispose or the authority ‘to direct’ the voting 
or disposition [of the securities].”170 Moreover, in adopting the beneficial 
ownership rules, the Commission chose not to extend the rules to relatives 
living in the same household because “such a standard was totally 
inapposite to the voting/investment power approach,”171 even though such 
persons may have significant influence over the voting or disposition of the 
securities by the beneficial owner.172 Further, the beneficial ownership rules 
were adopted “to provide more objective standards” for the rules defining 
beneficial owner,173 and an influence standard is based on subjectivity, 
which could lead to substantial uncertainty for persons attempting to 
comply with Rule 13d-3(a).174 Because the Long Party to an equity swap 
merely has the ability to influence the voting or disposition of the securities, 
he does not have voting or investment power as defined in Rule 13d-3(a).175 
Consequently, such person or entity, including TCI, does not have to 
disclose his long position in an equity swap. 
The third reason that holders of long positions in equity swaps do not 
have beneficial ownership of the Matched Shares is because this judicial 
interpretation of Rule 13(d)-3(a) incorrectly assumes that the Short Parties 
always hedge by purchasing the referenced security, and/or that the Long 
Parties always have the ability to direct the voting and/or disposition of the 
securities, and such assumptions would lead to substantial uncertainty in 
applying the Rule. With respect to dispositive power, the argument for 
beneficial ownership is that the Short Party has to hedge with Matched 
Shares, and that he will sell the shares when the Long Party unwinds the 
swap.176 However, the Short Party does not always purchase the underlying 
shares to hedge its position in the swap, as hedging practices vary widely 
among dealers.177 Further, even where it does hedge with such shares, it 
may sell them prior to the unwinding of the equity swap or may hold on to 
them even after the swap is unwound.178 Consequently, even assuming that 
there are situations where the Long Party has the ability to direct the 
disposition of the security by causing the Short Party to purchase the 
                                                          
 170. See Breheny Letter, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 171. See Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements Release, supra note 34, at 12,348. 
 172. See ISDA Brief, supra note 73, at 15–16. 
 173. Id. at 16 (quoting Adoption of Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements, Securities 
Act Release No. 5808, Exchange Act Release No. 13,291, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,342, at 12,343 (Mar. 3, 
1977) (emphasis in original).  
 174. Id. at 19. 
 175. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2009). 
 176. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) L.L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 541–43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 177. See TORTORIELLO & GLOTZER, supra note 80; see also Black Letter, supra note 11, at 7 
(“when hedging occurs, it often (but not always) involves purchasing ‘matched shares.’”). 
 178. See supra part II.C. 
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underlying shares or by causing the Short Party to sell the shares when the 
Long Party unwinds the swap, there are circumstances where this is not the 
case. With respect to voting power, the argument for beneficial ownership 
is that Long Parties can direct or influence the voting of the securities by 
the Short Parties and/or that they can acquire the Matched Shares upon an 
exchange unwind and obtain voting rights.179 However, market realities are 
such that dealers make their own voting decisions without consulting with 
the swap counterparties, or may have a policy of not voting their shares.180 
Therefore, while there may be situations where the Long Party has the 
ability to direct the voting of the shares, or at least has the ability to 
influence the voting (assuming arguendo that influence is the correct 
standard), there are situations where this is not the case. Further, as 
explained with respect to dispositive power, because the Short Party does 
not always purchase Matched Shares—and even when the Short Party 
purchases the Matched Shares—there is no guarantee that it will sell the 
shares to the counterparty upon the unwinding of the swap. Thus, there is 
uncertainty as to whether the Long Party can obtain voting rights. 
The uncertainty created by the judicial interpretation of a Rule 
requiring disclosure of beneficial ownership by Long Parties whose 
counterparties’ hedge with Matched Shares would be difficult for the SEC 
to administer, since beneficial ownership would be determined solely based 
upon whether, and in what manner, the Short Party hedged the swap.181 
Further, because “there is no economic difference to an investor between an 
equity swap hedged by the derivatives dealer with [M]atched [S]hares, and 
an equity swap hedged in another way, one cannot logically say that the 
former conveys § 13(d) beneficial ownership and the latter does not.”182 
Moreover, parties could simply contract around the Rule by stating in the 
swap contract that Short Parties cannot hedge with physically Matched 
Shares, and thus, the Rule would not capture all long positions in equity 
swaps.183 Parties seeking to avoid § 13(d) may simply start to use cash-
settled single stock futures that have very similar economic characteristics 
to equity swaps, but that according to a Commission interpretation, do not 
confer beneficial ownership.184 
                                                          
 179. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 542–45. 
 180. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 8. 
 181. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 1317. 
 182. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 16. 
 183. Id. at 12.  
 184. Id. at 13. The following interpretation is from an Exchange Act Release:  
  Q18: Would the equity securities underlying a security future that requires cash 
settlement be counted for purposes of determining whether the purchaser of the contract 
is subject to the Regulation 13D beneficial ownership reporting requirements?  
  A18: No. A purchaser of a cash-settled security future (i.e., a security future that, by 
its terms, must be settled by a cash payment) would not count the equity securities 
underlying the contract for purposes of determining whether he or she is subject to the 
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Because the standard posited by the court depends on specific market 
practices, it will not lead to uniform results. This will make compliance and 
administration difficult. For example,  
[i]f an investor who holds matched shares is the beneficial owner (in the 
13(d) sense) of the matched shares which its dealers holds as a hedge, but 
the dealer retains the power to hedge in any way it wants, to change the 
form of its hedge over time, and to potentially not hedge at all, how is the 
investor to know how many shares it beneficially owns?185  
In this regard, “it would seem strange to decide ex post that equity swaps 
with dealer 1, which follows one set of practices, count as beneficial 
ownership of shares; while swaps with dealer 2, which follows a different 
set of practices, do not.”186 Such a vague, uncertain, and subjective standard 
is unworkable. As such, Long Parties should not have to disclose their 
ownership positions in equity swaps under a judicial interpretation of Rule 
13d-3(a).187 The Commission should amend this rule to capture these 
ownership positions. 
                                                          
Regulation 13D reporting requirements, because he or she does not have the right to 
acquire beneficial ownership of the underlying security.  
Commission Guidance on the Application of Certain Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules Thereunder to Trading in Security Futures Products, 
Securities Act Release No. 8107, Exchange Act Release No. 46,101; 67 Fed. Reg. 43,234, at 
43,240 (June 27, 2002). 
 185. See Black Letter, supra note 11, at 11. In addition,  
among other potential consequences, market participants –  
Will face substantial uncertainty as to when their participation in swap 
transactions may give rise to reporting obligations because they could be 
said, in retrospect, to have had “influence” over someone else who held 
securities or been part of a “scheme to evade” reporting requirements. 
Will have to design and implement highly sophisticated and extremely 
expensive monitoring systems, if even possible, to ensure that disclosure 
obligations are not triggered by securities that they do not own, but over 
whose owners they may have “influence” or whose “accumulation” may be 
considered to be part of a “scheme to evade” reporting requirements.  
Will face uncertainty as to how standards that largely depend on the 
“practical realities” of the “real world” will be affected by changes in market 
practices.  
Will constantly have to calibrate on a highly subjective scale how their 
actions might “influence” another to purchase or sell securities.   
ISDA Brief, supra note 73, at 25–26. 
 186. Black Letter, supra note 11, at 17.  
 187. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 1317–19. 
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B. RULE 13D-3(A) SHOULD BE AMENDED TO REQUIRE THE 
DISCLOSURE OF LONG POSITIONS IN EQUITY SWAPS 
The Commission is currently “evaluating whether persons using equity 
derivatives, such as an equity swap, should be subject to the beneficial 
ownership reporting provisions of the Exchange Act when accumulating 
substantial share positions in connection with change of control 
transactions.”188 The Commission should amend Rule 13d-3(a) to require 
such persons to be subject to the beneficial ownership rules. Other 
regulators have already adopted similar reforms,189 including the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), which regulates financial markets in the United 
Kingdom (U.K.).190 Similar to the FSA rules for contracts for difference, 
which are the U.K. equivalent of equity swaps, the Commission should 
amend Rule 13d-3(a) to require the disclosure of Long Parties’ holdings in 
equity swaps and other similar instruments. Disclosure should be required 
regardless of whether the instrument is physically settled in cash or in 
shares.191 Just like the U.K. rules, there should be an exemption for dealers 
that hold long positions in equity swaps as the result of client-servicing 
transactions (i.e., transactions that are not made on a proprietary basis, such 
as where a dealer writes a short equity swap for a client, resulting in the 
dealer holding a long position in the swap).192 According to the FSA, “[t]he 
principle behind [such an] exemption is that firms holding a position purely 
to facilitate a client position, with no interest in the performance of 
underlying equity, should not need to make a disclosure.”193 
Rule 13d-3(a) should be expanded to capture economic ownership by 
using concepts found in the definition of beneficial ownership in § 16 of the 
Exchange Act.194 Specifically, Rule 13d-3(a) should be amended to include 
a new category of beneficial ownership for any “[d]irect or indirect 
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pecuniary interest in such security.”195 “Pecuniary interest” should have the 
same definition as it does in Rule 16a-1.196 The definitions of “derivative 
instrument” and “immediate family” should have the same meaning that 
they have under this Rule.197 The definition of “indirect pecuniary interest” 
should also have the same definition that it has in the Rule; however, the 
provision regarding derivative securities should be expanded to capture 
long positions in equity swaps and long ownership positions in similar 
instruments.198 To this end, the definition of indirect pecuniary interest 
should be revised to include, among other things, “[a]ny derivative 
instrument which includes the opportunity, directly or indirectly, to profit or 
share in any profit . . . from the [subject security’s value increasing], 
including a person’s right to acquire the . . . security through the exercise or 
conversion of any derivative instrument, whether or not presently 
exercisable.”199 In addition, there should be an exemption for dealers 
holding long positions in equity swaps or similar instruments where these 
positions were acquired to facilitate client transactions. This exemption 
would apply to a client-serving intermediary (as defined in the Rule), which 
“(a) fulfill[s] orders received from clients otherwise than on a proprietary 
basis; (b) respond[s] to a client’s requests to trade otherwise than on a 
proprietary basis; or (c) hedge[s] positions arising out of dealings 
[described] in (a) or (b).”200 
Amending Rule 13d-3(a) in this manner would require disclosure of 
persons’ long positions in equity swaps, which would prevent them from 
using such positions to influence the voting or disposition of a company’s 
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securities, or engaging in an exchange unwind for the purposes of voting at 
the annual meeting, conducting a proxy contest, or making a tender offer. 
Currently, Long Parties have the ability to exert significant influence or 
control over a company, without public disclosure, in the following ways: 
First, when a Long Party enters into an equity swap, he, in certain instances, 
has the ability to influence the disposition of the underlying shares because 
the Short Party at times has no other effective means to hedge other than 
purchasing the Matched Shares (e.g., in the case of thinly traded stock).201 
Further, where the Short Party does hedge with Matched Shares, the Long 
Party has the ability to influence the disposition of the securities through 
unwinding the swap, regardless of whether he acquires the shares from the 
Short Party or the shares are sold in the open market.202 With respect to 
voting power, the Long Party has the ability to influence the voting of the 
securities by choosing a counterparty that has a similar voting interest.203 
Additionally, a Long Party may acquire a large amount of a company’s 
securities prior to an annual meeting of shareholders by engaging in an 
exchange unwind and then vote the newly obtained shares at the meeting. A 
Long Party could also engage in an exchange unwind and then launch a 
proxy contest. Moreover, Long Parties may conduct stealth takeovers, 
several of which have occurred in Switzerland, where the Long Party could 
acquire a large amount of securities through an equity swap, conduct an 
exchange unwind, and then launch a tender offer.204In addition, equity 
swaps can be used to conduct a “street sweep” tender offer, where a bidder 
“can acquire [shares], cross the 5% threshold for 13D disclosure, and . . . 
before the 13D must be filed, buy up to 9.9% of a target’s shares (stopping 
short of the 10% level that would trigger . . . Exchange Act § 16) and then 
use decoupling strategies to jump to a much higher level,” prior to ever 
filing a Schedule 13D.205 Because Long Parties to equity swaps currently 
can exert significant influence or control over a company without making 
public disclosure, Rule 13d-3(a) needs to be amended to require these 
persons to disclose their ownership positions. Such an amendment will alert 
investors and the marketplace to the accumulation of these large economic 
positions in a company’s stock. 
Amending Rule 13d-3(a) would promote investor protection because it 
would give investors information regarding persons with large economic 
positions in the securities of a company that have the ability to influence or 
control the company. It would also preserve market integrity because it 
assures that a large economic position in a company’s stock, the disclosure 
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of which often results in an increase in the stock price, reaches the 
marketplace. Regarding the CSX opinion, while the court in the case was 
correct in reasoning that there should be disclosures of long positions in 
equity swaps, reform should not be made through judicial interpretation 
because such interpretation leads to substantial uncertainty in the 
application of the Rule.206 Moreover, because the Rule was written in the 
1970s, before equity swaps or other over-the-counter derivatives existed, it 
is more appropriate to amend the beneficial ownership rules than try to 
come up with a meaningful interpretation of an antiquated law.207 Thus, 
while the court in CSX reached the correct conclusion from a policy 
standpoint, the optimal way for long positions in equity swaps to be 
disclosed is to amend Rule 13d-3(a).208 
Investors are not the only ones who need information about Long 
Parties’ holdings in equity swaps, as this information is also critical to 
issuers. Presently, companies are engaging in private ordering by adopting 
second generation advance notice bylaws and poison pills that include a 
definition of beneficial ownership that encompasses equity swaps and other 
similar instruments.209 They are doing so to fill a regulatory gap in the 
definition of beneficial ownership in Rule 13d-3(a).210 The private ordering 
that is occurring in this context can simply be defined as the coming 
together of non-governmental parties in voluntary arrangements to adopt 
rules in an area where the government has not yet regulated.211 
One way that private ordering is occurring is through the insertion of 
provisions in advance-notice bylaws.212 Advance-notice bylaws are bylaws 
“regulating the ability of shareholders to nominate directors or place items 
on the agenda for consideration at a company’s annual or special meeting or 
by consent.”213 Such bylaws obligate shareholders to provide a specific 
amount of notice to the company of their proposed directors or agenda 
items prior to the meeting date.214 Regarding these bylaws, “[t]ransparency 
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and accountability for decoupled equity and voting interests in the context 
of actual or potential proxy contests was the first problem addressed by 
private ordering [in the area of decoupling].”215 Right around the time of the 
CSX decision, companies began to insert provisions in their advance-notice 
bylaws that define beneficial ownership in a way that captures Long 
Parties’ positions in equity swaps and long ownership positions in other 
similar instruments.216 
Another way that private ordering is occurring is through the adoption 
or renewal of second generation poison pills.217 These anti-takeover devices 
are being adopted or renewed to include a definition of beneficial 
ownership that encompasses long ownership positions in equity swaps and 
other similar instruments.218 The rationale for adopting these shareholder 
rights plans is the ease at which such instruments can be converted to 
traditional equity by activist investors attempting a proxy contest, or others 
interested in a change of control transaction.219 
The private ordering that is occurring in the adoption of advance notice 
bylaws and poison pills to capture long positions in equity swaps and other 
similar instruments shows that companies need information about parties’ 
ownership positions in these securities.220 Companies should not have to fill 
the regulatory gap in Rule 13d-3(a) by drafting provisions that create a 
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definition of beneficial ownership capturing these ownership positions. 
Rather, such a definition is properly the subject of Commission rulemaking. 
Consequently, the Commission should amend Rule 13d-3(a) to assure that 
the definition of beneficial ownership includes Long Parties’ holdings in 
equity swaps and other similar instruments. 
C. PERSONS DO NOT HAVE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP UNDER RULE 
13D-3(B) UNLESS THEY ARE BENEFICIAL OWNERS UNDER RULE 
13D-3(A) 
As previously mentioned, Rule 13d-3(b) provides that any person who 
(1) uses a contract, (2) with the purpose or effect of preventing the vesting 
of beneficial ownership of a security, (3) as part of a plan or scheme to 
evade the reporting requirements of § 13(d) is deemed a beneficial owner of 
the security.221 Since equity swaps are contracts and TCI entered into such 
agreements with the counterparties, the first element is met.222 Regarding 
the second element, TCI acted with the purpose and effect of preventing the 
vesting of beneficial ownership by entering into equity swaps because one 
of its motives in purchasing the swaps was the avoidance of reporting under 
§ 13(d), and because it monitored its counterparties to assure that they 
stayed below the 5% ownership threshold that would require disclosure.223 
However, TCI did not violate Rule 13d-3(b) because in order to engage in a 
plan or scheme to evade the reporting requirements of § 13(d) a person has 
to be a beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(a).224 Since TCI is not a 
beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(a),225 it cannot be deemed a beneficial 
owner under Rule 13d-3(b). 
The first reason that TCI should not have been deemed the beneficial 
owner of the shares under Rule 13d-3(b) is because the ownership of long 
positions in equity swaps does not constitute beneficial ownership under  
§ 13(d) or Rule 13d-3(a),226 and thus, the swaps were not used to create the 
false appearance of non-ownership of a security. Absent unusual 
circumstances or an egregious situation, the “plan or scheme to evade” 
language requires a showing that there was intent to enter into an 
arrangement that creates a false appearance.227 While Long Parties to equity 
swaps, including TCI, often purchase swaps to exert control over a 
company while avoiding disclosure under § 13(d),228 this conduct does not 
comport with the meaning of the terms unusual circumstances, or egregious 
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situation. Therefore, the issue is whether the arrangement created a false 
appearance. The term “false appearance” refers to the false appearance of 
the non-ownership of a security,229 rather than, as the district court found, 
the “false appearance that there is no large accumulation of securities that 
might have a potential for shifting corporate control.”230 According to the 
SEC Division of Corporation Finance, for the transaction to fall within the 
“plan or scheme to evade” language, it must be a sham where the equity 
swap is being used to create a false appearance or illusion that is contrary to 
the actual situation (i.e., the person is not actually the owner of the 
shares).231 However, it is the contention of this Article that in order to have 
the intent to enter into an arrangement that creates a false appearance of 
non-ownership, one must in fact be the beneficial owner of the security in 
the first place. In this regard, it is impossible to use an equity swap to create 
the false appearance that the person is not a beneficial owner where the 
person’s ownership position does not meet the definition of beneficial 
ownership under Rule 13d-3(a). Simply put, entering into an equity swap to 
avoid the reporting and disclosure requirements is not necessarily a 
violation of § 13(d).232 While acting with such a purpose satisfies the 
second element of Rule 13d-3(b), it does not attest to whether the person 
had a plan or scheme to evade the reporting requirements.233 Thus, a 
person’s actions do not come within Rule 13d-3(b) when his ownership 
position does not constitute beneficial ownership under § 13(d) or Rule 
13d-3(a). 
This conclusion is best explained by reference to the interpretation of a 
similar safe-harbor rule in Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
Securities Act) which reads that “this section is not available with respect to 
any transaction or series of transactions that, although in technical 
compliance with this section, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
registration provisions of the [Securities] Act. In such cases, registration 
under the [Securities] Act is required.”234 This safe-harbor, as well as a 
correlative provision in Regulation S of the Securities Act, was interpreted 
by the Staff to not apply when a person engages in a sham transaction to 
create the illusion that the transaction should be exempt from registration 
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under the Securities Act.235 On the other hand, where the person simply 
enters into a transaction that is not covered by the Securities Act, the safe 
harbors are inapplicable.236 For example, a person conducting a private 
placement of equity swaps does not engage in a plan or scheme to evade the 
Securities Act because swaps are not securities under it.237 Consequently, 
the person has simply complied with the Securities Act by not issuing 
securities and the safe harbor is inapplicable.238 Similarly, the owning of 
long positions in equity swaps does not constitute beneficial ownership 
under § 13(d). Moreover, the Exchange Act generally does not apply to 
equity swaps, but rather to voting shares.239 The holder of a long position in 
equity swaps has simply complied with the Exchange Act by entering into a 
transaction that does not trigger disclosure under § 13(d), and thus, Rule 
13d-3(b) and its “plan or scheme to evade” language does not apply. 
Consequently, “a person that does nothing more than enter into an equity 
swap should not be found to have engaged in an evasion of the reporting 
requirements.”240 In other words, “[o]ne does not evade a statute by 
complying with it.”241 
The second reason why long positions in equity swaps do not come 
within the purview of Rule 13d-3(b) is because the only statement by the 
Commission regarding violations of this rule is an example of “stock 
parking,” an activity which includes several elements that differentiate it 
from hidden ownership through the use of equity swaps.242 In the 
Commission Release giving an example of a violation of Rule 13d-3(b), X 
caused 10 institutions to each purchase 3% of Z Corporation for X and gave 
A an irrevocable proxy, which will lapse.243 Under these facts, the 
Commission concluded that X is deemed a beneficial owner under Rule 
13d-3(b).244 In this example, X had beneficial ownership of the shares, but 
it was hidden because he “parked” his voting rights with a third party by 
giving such party an irrevocable proxy.245 Thus, this example stands for the 
proposition that a beneficial owner who attempts to conceal his ownership 
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of the shares by transferring voting control to a third party is deemed a 
beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(b).246 Like person X in the stock parking 
example, a person that purchases a long position in an equity swap may do 
so to avoid disclosure. Such person has essentially transferred voting 
control to a third party, provided that the third party has hedged with 
Matched Shares. More importantly, however, unlike person X, a Long Party 
to an equity swap is not a beneficial owner attempting to conceal his 
beneficial ownership, as there have been no purchases of physical shares.247 
Rather, he has engaged in an investment that is not subject to § 13(d).248 In 
addition, there are two other material distinctions between shares parked 
with another party and shares purchased by a Short Party for hedging 
purposes.249 In this regard, “[p]arking involves an understanding that the 
client will buy the stock back at a later date and protect its counterparty 
against loss.”250 With an equity swap, there is no such understanding and 
the dealer must protect itself against loss.251 Thus, hedging with Matched 
Shares is distinguishable from conventional stock parking. Consequently, a 
holder of a long position in an equity swap should not be deemed a 
beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(b). 
The third reason that Long Parties to equity swaps should not be 
deemed beneficial owners of the shares held by Short Parties under Rule 
13d-3(b) is because the Commission did not intend for the Rule to capture 
purely economic interests. When the Commission issued the proposing 
release regarding the beneficial ownership rules, the definition of beneficial 
ownership included “the right to receive or the power to direct the receipt of 
dividends from or the proceeds from the sale” of equity securities.252 These 
economic interests are nearly identical to those received by the Long Party 
in an equity swap.253 The Commission, however, ultimately decided not to 
include these economic interests in the definition of beneficial ownership.254 
Instead, the Commission decided to include Item 5 of Schedule 13D, which 
required disclosure by actual beneficial owners of “any other person . . . 
known to have an economic interest,” such as the right to receive dividends 
or sale proceeds.255 Thus, the Commission distinguished beneficial 
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ownership from economic ownership by drafting rules where economic 
only interests do not create beneficial ownership, but requiring that such 
interests be disclosed by actual beneficial owners.256 In promulgating Rule 
13d-3(b), the Commission surely “did not intend that an arrangement it had 
expressly concluded should not fall within the definition of beneficial 
ownership [i.e., arrangements where the party only has economic interests] 
would result in its participants being ‘deemed’ beneficial owners under the 
‘scheme to evade’ provision.”257 Consequently, Rule 13d-3(b) should not be 
used to deem holders of long positions in equity swaps beneficial owners of 
the shares held by Short Parties. 
D. THE NEED FOR STERILIZATION AND COURTS WILLING TO 
ENJOIN THE VOTING OF SHARES 
The court in CSX should have sterilized the votes for the shares 
illegally obtained by TCI and 3G because failing to do so results in 
irreparable harm to CSX shareholders since the voting of the shares resulted 
in an unfair director election. In addition, courts should more readily grant 
this remedy in § 13(d) proceedings. While the court in CSX rightly stated 
that “a threat of irreparable injury is essential to obtain an injunction 
sterilizing any of defendants’ voting rights,” 258 it incorrectly held that CSX 
did not establish such a threat.259 Consequently, TCI and 3G should not be 
able to succeed in a proxy contest by voting shares that they obtained in 
violation of the securities laws to the detriment of CSX’s other 
shareholders. 
The failure to sterilize votes leads to an unfair election of directors, as 
demonstrated when TCI and 3G obtained the shares at a reduced price, 
giving them an ill-gotten voting position in the securities.260 In this regard, 
“TCI admitted that one of its motivations in avoiding disclosure was to 
avoid paying a higher price for the shares of CSX, which would have been 
the product of front-running that it expected would occur if its interest in 
CSX were disclosed to the market generally.”261 If TCI and 3G had to pay a 
greater price for the securities, their ownership position would likely have 
been smaller, and the positions of other CSX shareholders would probably 
have been more significant. Under these circumstances, TCI and 3G would 
have had to obtain a larger amount of support to prevail in the proxy contest 
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than was necessary at the time of the contest.262 By purchasing these shares 
at a reduced price, the funds were able to gain an unfair advantage in their 
efforts to exercise control over CSX.263 Specifically, they accumulated an 
economic interest requiring disclosure and failed to disclose such interest, 
while tipping selective third party funds and encouraging them to acquire 
CSX.264 Obtaining the shares at a reduced price increased the voting power 
of TCI and 3G, allowing them to manipulate the corporate electorate and 
giving them a significant advantage in the proxy contest.265 As a result, their 
votes should have been sterilized to prevent an unfair director election.266 
The court’s failure to sterilize votes will lead to an unfair election of 
directors because it improperly tilts the playing field in favor of activist 
hedge funds. In drafting the Williams Act, the drafters commented upon the 
“extreme care” which was taken “‘to avoid tipping the balance of regulation 
either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover 
bid.’”267 In violating the Williams Act, TCI and 3G changed the 
composition of CSX’s shareholder base to the detriment of those CSX 
shareholders who may not have shared their vision for the company.268 
Specifically, many activist hedge funds, including TCI and 3G, attempt to 
maximize the stock price over a short time period and realize quick 
profits.269 However, other shareholders are often focused on long-term 
growth.270 In this regard, the court should not have allowed TCI and 3G to 
employ a scheme to avoid disclosure as a means of gaining an unfair 
advantage over shareholders who do not share their investment goals. By 
allowing the funds to vote shares in a proxy contest that were obtained 
when other shareholders did not possess complete information about the 
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funds’ ownership positions or intentions,271 the court improperly tilted the 
playing field in favor of activist hedge funds. Therefore, such entities, 
including TCI and 3G, should have been enjoined from voting shares 
obtained when in violation of § 13(d). 
The third reason that the failure to sterilize votes results in an unfair 
election of directors is that corrective disclosure does not cure the harm 
caused by TCI and 3G. In this regard, the court acknowledged that  
[the] actions [of TCI and 3G] may have contributed to creating a corporate 
electorate that is materially different today than it was before [TCI and 
3G] made [their] purchases. Those who are content with present 
management and unconvinced by [TCI’s and 3G’s] blandishments may be 
in a weaker position than they might have occupied had [TCI and 3G] 
made full and timely disclosure. That all of the facts now have been 
disclosed does not alter this prospect.272 
Further, the court expressly acknowledged that the conduct of TCI and 3G 
increased the funds’ likelihood of prevailing in the proxy contest.273 Yet, 
one of the court’s rationales for not sterilizing the votes was that corrective 
disclosure had already been made.274 Corrective disclosure is simply not 
sufficient to remedy the unfair advantage gained by TCI and 3G in the 
proxy contest. “An injunction against future violations [and corrective 
disclosure], without more, not only leaves defendants their ill-gotten gains 
but also permits them to add to those gains every time they vote their 
shares.”275 While corrective disclosure gives shareholders the ability to 
make a decision after reading all the Schedule 13D information, it does not 
prevent TCI and 3G from voting shares obtained at a reduced price in 
violation of § 13(d). It also allows activist hedge funds to gain an unfair 
advantage in contests for corporate control. Consequently, the votes of TCI, 
3G, and other violators of § 13(d) should be sterilized.   
Fourth, the votes should have been sterilized because, in the actual 
proxy contest, two of the directors selected by the funds were elected by 
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less than 6.4% of the vote,276 which is the percentage of shares for which 
there were disclosure violations.277 In a very close election contest, CSX 
announced in July 2008 that “[i]f the Court decides in favor of the CSX 
position, [two of the TCI directors] will not have the votes needed to be 
elected to the Board.”278 After the Second Circuit issued a summary order 
affirming the decision to not enjoin the voting of the shares,279 the two TCI 
directors joined the board of CSX.280 Thus, two of the directors elected to 
the Board were elected with shares that were illegally obtained when TCI 
and 3G were in violation of § 13(d). This outcome shows the impact that 
the votes of illegally obtained shares can have on director elections and 
other agenda items at shareholder meetings. Consequently, the votes of 
TCI, 3G, and other shareholders that violate § 13(d) should be sterilized. 
The fifth reason why the votes should have been sterilized and why 
courts should more readily enjoin votes in future § 13(d) litigation is that, in 
certain circumstances, the Commission has recognized equitable relief as 
necessary to remedy intentional violations of § 13(d).281 In 1981, the 
Commission stated that a court’s equitable powers to remedy violations of  
§ 13(d) include “the authority to order any relief appropriate under the 
circumstances.”282 In this regard, “equitable remedies in addition to 
corrective disclosure . . . may be necessary or appropriate to remedy 
violations of the Williams Act, particularly in cases where the defendant 
deliberately violated Section 13(d).”283 Absent a sufficient remedy, 
shareholders could be irreparably harmed and the defendant would be 
permitted to benefit from his wrongful conduct.284 Further, where the 
remedy is limited to corrective disclosure, shareholders are not adequately 
protected from the harm flowing from the violation.285 Equity requires that 
violators of § 13(d) be prevented from taking advantage of the shares 
obtained while they were in violation of the statute.286 
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 By allowing TCI and 3G to vote in the proxy contest, the CSX court 
deprived other shareholders of adequate protection against the harm 
flowing from the violation of § 13(d). In this regard, the group should not 
have been permitted to take advantage of the shares it obtained while in 
violation of the statute. TCI and 3G should have been enjoined from voting 
their shares in the proxy contest. In addition, other courts addressing this 
issue should not hesitate in sterilizing the shares of parties that violate  
§ 13(d). 
The sixth reason why the votes should have been sterilized and why 
future courts should enjoin violators of § 13(d) from voting at shareholder 
meetings is that such a remedy is supported by the case law.287 In Rondeau, 
the Supreme Court held that a showing of irreparable harm is necessary for 
a private litigant to obtain injunctive relief in a suit under § 13(d).288 In that 
case, the purchaser acquired less than 10% of the issuer’s stock while 
unaware of the then recent amendment to § 13(d) lowering the triggering 
level of disclosure from 10% to 5%.289 The shareholder subsequently filed a 
Schedule 13D disclosing all of the required information and chose not to 
proceed with a tender offer.290 Further, the Court found that there was no 
evidence that the shareholder would fail to comply with § 13(d) in the 
future.291 Unlike Rondeau, where the defendant chose not to proceed with a 
tender offer, the defendants in CSX were attempting to take control of the 
company by engaging in a proxy contest.292 The other shareholders were 
put at a disadvantage in the contest because they did not have adequate 
information during the period in which TCI and 3G were preparing for the 
proxy fight. Further, TCI and 3G obtained their shares at a reduced price 
altering the corporate electorate of shareholders with votes at the meeting. 
There is also evidence that TCI and 3G may engage in this conduct in the 
future, as this proposition was the reason the court enjoined them from 
future violations of § 13(d).293 The parties’ conduct was not a mere 
technical violation like the shareholder’s actions in Rondeau, but displayed 
a willful disregard of the disclosure requirements of § 13(d). TCI and 3G 
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failed to file a Schedule 13D for ten months in order to acquire the stock at 
a reduced price and to avoid SEC disclosure requirements.294 Because the 
facts in CSX are distinguishable from Rondeau, the court should have 
sterilized the shares. 
Other district court opinions support a finding that the shares should 
have been sterilized. For example, in Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc v. 
Cormier Corp., several shareholders violated § 13(d) by failing to timely 
file a Schedule 13D.295 The violation was for failing to disclose their group 
formation and/or omitting material facts in the Schedule 13D regarding 
their control intent.296 These shareholders had agreed to acquire control of 
the company through a proxy fight.297 The court neutralized the shares 
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Management Reorganization and Corporate Strategy 
I. Management Reorganization  
A. 13-D Holders call for Special Shareholders Meeting  
1. Groups calling for special shareholders meeting  
a. Hodes-Gray  8%  
b. Robinson  5%  
c. Cormier  10%  
d. Gross   12%  
2. Proceed to arrange for meeting  
a. obtain shareholders list  
b. go to court to force meeting if necessary  
1. 13D groups excluding Gross meet to arrange cost sharing if and when a 
fight breaks out  
3. Upon presentation of demand for shareholders meeting, try to get Schwartz to 
peacefully agree to reorganize management i.e. have directors resign to be 
replaced by 13D nominees  
B. Should Schwartz not immediately agree to a change  
1. Initiate proxy fight 13D groups meet to agree on a full slate of directors  
C. The Proxy battle  
1. Nominees for reorganized board should include following characteristics  
a. stock ownership in size  
b. broad range of business disciplines  
c. automotive experience  
2. areas of weakness for 13D groups proxy battle  
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acquired by these persons in violation of § 13(d) ruling that all such shares 
had to be voted in proportion to the votes cast by all other shareholders.298 It 
reasoned that the “group’s conduct in failing to make proper disclosure 
[when] they were acquiring control . . . deprived Champion’s present 
shareholders of the opportunity to make a full range of different decisions 
as to Champion’s future course . . . [an] injury [that is] both irreparable and 
cognizable in equity.”299 The CSX court stated that the Champion decision 
“relied on considerations that are inappropriate in light of Rondeau.”300 
However, the Champion court relied on the fact that the company’s other 
shareholders suffered irreparable harm, which is precisely the standard for a 
preliminary injunction set forth in Rondeau.301 Further, Champion is 
distinguishable from Rondeau for the same reasons set forth above upon 
which CSX can be distinguished.  
In addition, Champion is analogous to CSX because both cases involved 
a disclosure violation for failing to timely disclose the formation of a  
§ 13(d) group, and each case related to a proxy contest.302 Moreover, like 
the shareholders in Champion, CSX shareholders were deprived of the 
opportunity to make informed decisions regarding CSX for the ten months 
during which TCI and 3G were acquiring the stock in violation of  
§ 13(d).303 Specifically, some of CSX’s shareholders may not have shared 
the hedge funds’ views regarding the future of the company, and, like the 
shareholders in Champion, such shareholders were deprived of the 
opportunity to make a reasoned investment decision regarding the 
company’s stock.304 Similar to the defendants in Champion, TCI and 3G 
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were able to increase their control position by 6.4% during the ten month 
period without the other CSX shareholders being aware of these parties’ 
acquisitions.305 As such, the corporate electorate of CSX may have been 
much different on the record date for the proxy contest had TCI and 3G 
disclosed their ownership positions. Consequently, the court in CSX should 
have followed the court in Champion and sterilized the shares of TCI and 
3G. 
Another case involving the sterilization of shares in the 13(d) context is 
Committee for New Management of Butler Aviation v. Widmark.306 In that 
case, the former CEO of a company initiated a proxy contest and acquired 
shares in anticipation of the meeting.307 The court found that he violated  
§ 13(d) by failing to timely file a Schedule 13D.308 The former CEO, just 
like the shareholder in Rondeau, argued that this was merely a technical 
violation.309 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that “[i]f [§] 13(d) 
means anything, [the former CEO] should not be permitted to gain 
advantage from a course of action pursued in clear violation of law.”310  
To put teeth in Section 13(d)(1), the court enjoined the shareholder from 
voting at the annual meeting all shares purchased during the twelve-month 
period in question in excess of 2 percent of the outstanding stock—in 
effect, all shares purchased after the Schedule 13D statement should have 
been filed with the Commission and sent to the issuer.311  
In Water & Wall Associates v. American Consumer Industries, several 
shareholders failed to timely disclose their formation of a group in violation 
of § 13(d).312 The court, relying on Butler Aviation, issued a preliminary 
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injunction restraining the voting of the shares beneficially owned by such 
persons.313 
While both of these cases were decided prior to Rondeau, both courts 
found that the shareholders would suffer irreparable harm if the shares were 
not sterilized.314 Just like the courts in Butler Aviation and Water & Wall 
Associates, the court in CSX should have enjoined TCI and 3G from voting 
the shares because failing to do so allows these shareholders to benefit from 
a course of action pursued in violation of § 13(d) to the detriment of the 
other shareholders of CSX. Moreover, based on the precedents in Rondeau, 
Champion, Butler Aviation, and Water & Wall Associates, courts should 
more frequently sterilize shares for violations of § 13(d) to prevent 
irreparable harm to shareholders. 
Lastly, the votes of TCI and 3G should have been sterilized, and other 
violators of § 13(d) should be enjoined from voting at shareholder 
meetings, in order to deter future violations by other parties. While 
deterrence cannot be an independent basis for an injunction under § 13(d), 
it is an important factor for courts to consider when determining whether to 
enjoin the voting of shares.315 In Rondeau, the Court acknowledged that the 
“usual basis for injunctive relief” is the “danger of recurrent violation” and 
such relief is designed “to deter, not to punish.”316 The Court further stated 
in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., that deterrence may be “a 
meaningful goal” in fashioning relief for “the most flagrant sort of 
violations” of the Williams Act.317 Moreover, according to the Commission  
[a]bsent a remedy that deprives the defendant of his wrongfully obtained 
shares [or the ability to vote such shares], a person will have little 
incentive to comply with the statute. On the one hand, the potential 
benefits to be gained from a violation can be quite substantial . . . [o]n the 
other hand, corrective disclosure is no real deterrent, since it merely 
requires compliance with the original statutory disclosure obligation and 
leaves the violator with the profitable fruits of his illegal conduct.318 
By failing to sterilize votes in cases like CSX, hedge funds and others 
will continue to have an incentive to avoid § 13(d) disclosure obligations to 
gain an advantage in a proxy contest or to obtain control in a stealth fashion 
by use of another takeover method. In this regard, the other shareholders of 
the company are not being afforded the protection of the federal securities 
laws, as hedge funds and others have the ability to gain an unfair advantage 
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by hiding their ownership positions until they decide to engage in a control 
contest. Moreover, market integrity is damaged when investors deliberately 
flout the § 13(d) disclosure requirements, but are still able to vote their 
shares. 319 Consequently, the shares of TCI and 3G and other violators of  
§ 13(d) should be sterilized to prevent further abuses of the Williams Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has explained that while holders of long positions in equity 
swaps have the ability to significantly influence the voting or disposition of 
the securities of a company, they do not have beneficial ownership under 
Rule 13d-3(a). It went on to provide a specific recommendation for how 
Rule 13d-3(a) should be amended to capture Long Parties’ holdings in 
equity swaps and other similar instruments. It showed that Rule 13d-3(b) 
should be construed in a manner analogous to the safe harbors in Rule 
144A and Regulation S, and thus, the Rule should only result in a person 
being deemed a beneficial owner where the person holds an interest in the 
security that is considered to constitute beneficial ownership under Rule 
13d-3(a). Lastly, the Article demonstrated that sterilization of votes is an 
appropriate remedy in a § 13(d) action to prevent unfair director elections 
and that such remedy should be granted more frequently to enjoin violators 
of § 13(d) from voting at shareholder meetings. 
If the Second Circuit decides to write an opinion on the CSX case, it 
should adopt the positions articulated in this Article: that TCI did not have 
beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3(a) and that it should not be deemed 
a beneficial owner under Rule 13d-3(b). Future court rulings on whether 
votes should be sterilized for violations of § 13(d) should enjoin violators of 
the statute from voting at shareholder meetings. Furthermore, the 
Commission should act quickly to require disclosure of Long Parties’ 
holdings in equity swaps and other similar instruments by amending Rule 
13d-3(a). More research may be necessary to determine whether a complete 
overhaul of the beneficial ownership regime is needed, and if so, how such 
change should be accomplished.320 
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